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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court has recently insisted that plaintiffs must
have standing for every claim that they raise. But this claim-specific
approach to standing is at odds with established practice in several
contexts, including rulings on the severability of statutes. Courts often
permit plaintiffs to claim that statutory provisions should be invalidated
pursuant to severability doctrine, without requiring that they have standing
for those claims. This Article argues that existing practice for severability
is a form of “supplemental standing.” Supplemental standing is analogous
to supplemental jurisdiction. It allows a plaintiff with standing for one
claim to raise related claims, even if the plaintiff lacks standing for those
other claims. Although the Supreme Court has purported to reject this
concept, current law effectively grants supplemental standing for
severability claims—and with good reason. When a court rules that part of
a statute is unconstitutional, a ruling on severability is necessary to give
effect to Congress’s intent regarding the remainder of the statute.
Supplemental standing permits those rulings, but claim-specific standing
would often prevent them. In the severability context, therefore,
supplemental standing is more faithful to the central purpose of standing
doctrine: preserving the separation of powers. This Article contends that
current practice also implicitly grants supplemental standing in additional
contexts, including facial challenges to statutes and cases involving
multiple plaintiffs. These examples suggest that, while the claim-specific
approach to standing is a useful default rule, the Court has been wrong to
insist on that approach as a categorical matter. The Article concludes by
exploring additional circumstances in which shifting to a supplementalstanding approach appears to be justified on separation of powers grounds.
AUTHOR—Olin-Smith Fellow in Law, Constitutional Law Center, Stanford
Law School. For helpful discussion and comments, I thank Jonathan Abel,
William Baude, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Jared Ellias, Daniel Epps,
Don Herzog, Michael McConnell, Stephen Sachs, Derek Webb, Andrew
Woods, and participants in the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop.

285

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 286
I.

II.

ESTABLISHED PRACTICE FOR STANDING AND SEVERABILITY ................................. 293
A.

Standing ..................................................................................................... 293

B.

Severability ................................................................................................. 295

C.

Standing and Severability ........................................................................... 299

CLAIM-SPECIFIC STANDING VS. SUPPLEMENTAL STANDING ................................... 310
A.

The Text of Article III Permits Claim-Specific Standing or
Supplemental Standing ............................................................................... 310

B.

The Supreme Court Has Adopted Claim-Specific Standing and Rejected
Supplemental Standing ............................................................................... 312

III. CLAIM-SPECIFIC STANDING AND SEVERABILITY .................................................... 316
A.

Claim-Specific Standing Conflicts with Practice on Severability ............... 316

B.

Claim-Specific Standing for Severability Would Undermine the Purposes
of Standing Doctrine ................................................................................... 327

IV. SUPPLEMENTAL STANDING ................................................................................... 331
A.

Supplemental Standing for Severability ...................................................... 332

B.

Toward a General Theory of Supplemental Standing ................................. 335

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 341

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a claim-specific
approach to standing doctrine. Under that approach, plaintiffs must have
standing for every claim that they raise.1 Suppose, for example, that a
plaintiff argues that two provisions of a statute are unconstitutional. The
Court has held that the plaintiff must satisfy the test for standing, including
the injury in fact requirement, with respect to both provisions.2
This claim-specific theory of standing can be contrasted with an
alternative approach that this Article calls “supplemental standing.”3
Supplemental standing would be analogous to supplemental jurisdiction,
which permits a plaintiff who asserts a federal claim to assert related state
law claims even if those state law claims do not independently fall within
1

See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352–53 (2006).
See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733–34 (2008).
3
See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 (describing this concept as “ancillary standing,” and rejecting it); cf.
13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.16 (3d ed. 2008)
(referring to a related but distinct question of whether a party can challenge a given transaction based on
any substantive theory as a question of “supplemental standing”).
2
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the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.4 A supplementalstanding approach would similarly permit a plaintiff with standing for one
claim to assert related claims, even if the plaintiff lacked standing for those
other claims. For example, plaintiffs who have standing to challenge one
provision of a statute could theoretically have supplemental standing to
challenge other provisions of the statute that do not injure them.
Supplemental standing would therefore expand the universe of claims that
a federal court has the constitutional power to decide.
In its recent decision in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Supreme
Court rejected the concept of supplemental standing on two grounds.5 First,
it asserted that the claim-specific theory of standing is dictated by
established practice.6 The Court relied on previous decisions that required
plaintiffs to establish standing for each claim that they raised, albeit
without mentioning the possibility of supplemental standing.7 Second, it
concluded that the claim-specific approach is required for functional
reasons.8 Standing doctrine is meant to protect the separation of powers and
promote sound decisionmaking by limiting courts to the resolution of
concrete, adverse disputes.9 The Court reasoned that the claim-specific
approach to standing is also necessary to preserve these interests.10 In other
words, if standing requirements are not applied on a claim-specific basis,
the Court concluded that they might as well not be applied at all.
The academic literature on standing has largely overlooked the Court’s
adoption of a claim-specific approach and its rejection of supplemental
standing. Scholars have focused on the application of the doctrine to
individual claims, rather than cases involving multiple claims.11 Of course,
academic treatment of standing has not been sympathetic. Scholars have
argued for decades that the doctrine—at least to the extent that it requires a
showing of injury in fact—should be abandoned because it is illegitimate

4

See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
See 547 U.S. at 351–52.
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
See id. at 352–53.
9
See, e.g., id. at 341–42; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007).
10
See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 352–53.
11
For scholarly critiques of standing doctrine as applied to individual claims, see, for example,
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008); William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191
(2014); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
5
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and unprincipled.12 The Supreme Court has nevertheless remained
committed to standing doctrine in the face of this scholarly criticism.13
This Article suggests that supplemental standing offers a way forward.
That is because adopting the concept of supplemental standing would help
to alleviate the problems that scholars have identified with standing
doctrine. Yet it should also appeal to supporters of existing standing
principles, including a majority of the Supreme Court.
Supplemental standing would help to address at least two substantial
scholarly concerns with existing standing principles. First, scholars have
observed that standing doctrine can undermine the rule of law.14
Sometimes, when the government commits a legal violation, no plaintiff
will have standing to challenge it. Under current standing principles, the
courts can never remedy such a violation. The result is that the law goes
unenforced.15 Supplemental standing could help to alleviate this problem by
authorizing the federal courts to decide more claims, and thus to remedy
some legal violations that might otherwise never be redressed.
Second, scholars have pointed out that existing standing law is often
undemocratic.16 Because it treats an injury in fact as a constitutional
requirement, standing doctrine limits Congress’s power to create new
private rights of action.17 Even when Congress concludes that it is
important to allow private parties to bring suit to enforce federal law in the
absence of standing, current doctrine forbids it. Supplemental standing, in
contrast, would not require an injury in fact for every claim, and would
therefore grant Congress more discretion to decide who should be able to
bring suit in federal court. Thus, supplemental standing would help to
ensure that standing requirements are subject to democratic control. For
these reasons, while it cannot solve every problem with standing law,
supplemental standing would almost certainly be preferable to the claimspecific approach from the perspective of those who are skeptical of
existing doctrine.
The bulk of this Article, however, is dedicated to a more difficult
question—whether even the supporters of existing standing doctrine should
agree that supplemental standing is warranted in at least some
circumstances. To address that question, this Article considers whether
implementing standing doctrine on a claim-specific basis makes sense on
12

See Elliott, supra note 11, at 466–67 (summarizing the criticisms of standing doctrine).
See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142–43 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs
lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge against government surveillance of electronic
communications).
14
See, e.g., Re, supra note 11, at 1205.
15
See id.
16
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 210–11.
17
See, e.g., id. at 211, 219–20.
13
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its own terms. That is, assuming that standing is a constitutional
requirement, do the purported rationales for taking a claim-specific
approach to standing hold up? Is it truly consistent with established
practice, and does it serve the purposes that the Court says it does?18 If not,
then even defenders of standing law should agree that there is a problem.
On inspection, there is such a problem. This Article argues that the
claim-specific approach to standing conflicts with established practice in a
context that has become increasingly important in recent years: rulings on
the severability of statutes. It also argues that requiring claim-specific
standing for severability would contradict the central purposes of standing
doctrine. The Court’s justifications for claim-specific standing therefore
break down in the context of severability.
To develop these points, a brief introduction to severability doctrine is
helpful. When part of a statute is unconstitutional, severability principles
determine what happens to the remainder of the statute.19 The Supreme
Court’s current approach to severability focuses on Congress’s intent. It
asks whether, if Congress had been aware of the constitutional problem
with part of the statute, it would still have enacted the remainder of the
statute.20 Severability doctrine therefore aims to preserve the separation of
powers by leaving the constitutionally valid parts of a statute intact only if
Congress would have wanted them to stand on their own.21
Established practice on severability is at odds with the claim-specific
theory of standing. Courts and scholars widely agree that a court always
has the power to apply severability doctrine after it rules that part of a
statute is unconstitutional.22 For reasons explained below, however, the
18

Professor Elliott has argued that standing doctrine itself does not serve the purposes that the
Court has assigned to it. See Elliott, supra note 11, at 467–68. The Court, however, has continued to
assert that the doctrine advances the separation of powers and ensures good judicial decisions. See, e.g.,
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–47; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007). To meet the
Court on its own terms, therefore, this Article assumes that standing doctrine can achieve those
objectives, and asks whether a claim-specific approach is better or worse at achieving them than a
supplemental-standing approach.
19
See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 743–44 (2010).
20
See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330–31 (2006) (holding
that the partially unconstitutional applications of a statute regulating abortion were potentially severable
and remanding for consideration of legislative intent).
21
See id. at 329–31.
22
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (addressing severability without mentioning standing); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that standing principles do not limit a court’s power to
decide severability); Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 305 (2007) (“Upon
finding a law unconstitutional, a court must do its best to implement the remaining will of the very
legislature that enacted the invalid law . . . .”); Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate,
64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 76–77 (2012) (arguing that, if a court rules that the statutory provision that injures
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claim-specific approach would prevent a court from applying severability
doctrine if the plaintiff lacked standing to raise it.23 As a result, existing
practice on severability is best understood as a form of supplemental
standing. When a court rules that part of a statute is unconstitutional,
current law implicitly grants the plaintiff supplemental standing to raise a
claim about severability.
Consider, for example, National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius (NFIB),24 in which the Court nearly struck down the entire
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on inseverability
grounds. There was no doubt in NFIB that the plaintiff States had standing
to argue that the ACA’s expansion of the Medicaid program was
unconstitutional.25 Under the claim-specific approach, however, the States
did not appear to have standing to challenge the many other provisions of
the ACA, such as the requirement that individuals purchase health
insurance, or the requirement that insurance coverage be provided without
regard for preexisting health conditions.26 The Court nonetheless effectively
granted the States supplemental standing to challenge those other
provisions by considering their argument that the Medicaid expansion
could not be severed, and that the entire statute should therefore be struck
down.27 The States did not succeed on that argument, but that is because the
Court rejected it on the merits, not for lack of standing.
Although it would be possible to depart from current practice and
apply the claim-specific theory to severability questions, supplemental
standing for severability is more faithful to the interests that standing law is
meant to serve—separation of powers and sound decisionmaking. When a
court rules that part of a statute is unconstitutional, a ruling on severability
protects the separation of powers by ensuring that the court does not leave
in place a revised version of the statute that Congress never would have

the plaintiff is unconstitutional, then the court can decide whether that provision is severable from other
provisions that do not injure the plaintiff).
23
Although at least one commentator has recently recognized this inconsistency between
severability doctrine and the claim-specific approach to standing, he took the claim-specific standing
theory as a given, and did not address the possibility of supplemental standing. See Eric S. Fish,
Severability as Conditionality, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 48–51) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395650 [http://perma.cc/N67V-JF6B]) (assuming that standing should be
claim-specific in the severability context).
24
132 S. Ct. 2566.
25
See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that “the state plaintiffs undeniably ha[d] standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions”).
26
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (plurality opinion) (describing these provisions of the ACA); cf.
Florida, 648 F.3d at 1243 (declining to decide whether the States had standing to challenge the
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance).
27
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (plurality opinion); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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enacted. Supplemental standing permits the court to make such a ruling on
severability, but the claim-specific approach often would not. As a result,
even the defenders of narrow standing principles on the Supreme Court
have recognized that limiting a court’s authority to make severability
decisions would interfere with the separation of powers.28 Using standing
law to limit severability rulings also would do little to promote accurate
decisions. Because severability is a purely legal question of Congress’s
intent, judicial accuracy on severability is particularly unlikely to be
enhanced by the injury in fact requirement.29
The claim-specific approach would also undermine the purposes of
standing doctrine in the severability context for additional reasons. As
explained below, even though it would limit a court’s power to make
severability rulings, the claim-specific approach would not limit the court’s
power to make highly abstract constitutional rulings. That is because the
claim-specific approach would still permit plaintiffs to argue that, even if
the part of the statute that applies to them is constitutional, that part of the
statute is invalid because some other part of the statute is both
unconstitutional and inseverable. This type of claim is analogous to a First
Amendment overbreadth claim, under which plaintiffs have standing to
argue that a statute is wholly invalid because its application to other parties
is unconstitutional.30
The claim-specific approach would therefore produce a
counterintuitive asymmetry: It would limit plaintiffs’ ability to make
severability arguments about parts of a statute that do not apply to them,
but not their ability to make constitutional arguments about parts of a
statute that do not apply to them. From the perspective of separation of
powers, that would get things backwards—particularly because Congress
can overturn a court’s severability rulings, but not its constitutional
rulings.31 As a result, applying the claim-specific theory of standing to
severability would not only depart from existing practice, but also have
deeply troubling consequences.
28

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also
Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn when Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under
Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 551 (2012) (recognizing that “conservative members of
the Court usually support restrictive standing doctrine”).
29
Cf. Elliott, supra note 11, at 474 (arguing that the injury in fact requirement does little to ensure
good judicial decisionmaking even as a general matter).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (describing overbreadth doctrine);
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM.
U. L. REV. 359, 368–70 (1998) (recognizing that overbreadth claims and inseverability claims are
analogous).
31
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (observing that “[t]he ball now lies
in [Congress’s] court” after ruling on the severability of federal sentencing provisions, and noting that
Congress could overturn the Court’s severability ruling).
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If severability were the only context in which the claim-specific theory
encountered these problems, the Court’s categorical embrace of that theory
might still be defensible as a matter of uniformity and simplicity. But at
least two other well-known doctrines conflict with claim-specific standing,
and instead follow a supplemental-standing approach. First, when courts
strike down statutes pursuant to facial challenges, they rule on whether the
statute can be applied not just to the plaintiff, but to anyone.32 In effect,
therefore, courts grant plaintiffs raising facial challenges supplemental
standing to assert the claims of other potential plaintiffs. Second, it has
long been agreed that, if one plaintiff has standing for a claim, a court need
not decide whether other plaintiffs in the same case also have standing for
that claim.33 This rule operates as a form of supplemental standing because
it permits plaintiffs who lack standing for their own claims to obtain relief
when another plaintiff has standing.34 Like severability, the established
practices for facial challenges and cases with multiple plaintiffs are also
faithful to the purposes of standing doctrine.35
These examples confirm that the Court has been incorrect in
purporting to adopt the claim-specific theory of standing as a categorical
matter. Although that theory provides a useful default rule, it is subject to
well-established and well-justified exceptions. And those exceptions are
best explained by the concept of supplemental standing. Because
supplemental standing already applies in practice and is justified in
principle, standing doctrine should be revised to account for it. Although
this Article does not attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of
supplemental standing, it sketches some potential contours of such a
theory, and explores additional categories of cases in which shifting to a
supplemental-standing approach may be warranted.
32

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and ThirdParty Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2000) (explaining that a favorable ruling on a facial
challenge results in the “total unenforceability” of the statute).
33
See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–64 & n.9
(1977).
34
See, e.g., Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of
Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be—Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and
Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717, 741–48 (1995) (relying on principles drawn from supplemental
jurisdiction to argue that this practice is consistent with Article III).
35
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915,
964 (2011) (explaining that facial challenges are consistent with the separation of powers because “[i]t
is the Court’s function sometimes to resolve uncertainty and to ensure effective constitutional
implementation by laying down broad, clear rules or tests that may have the effect of establishing . . .
that a particular statute is unconstitutional in all applications”); Steinman, supra note 34, at 729
(observing that the rule for multiple plaintiffs “comports with a number of the basic values that are
served by standing doctrine,” including the separation of powers, because “so long as some plaintiff has
standing, the courts can be assured that, by hearing the case, they are fulfilling the role of the federal
judiciary in our governmental system, but not exceeding their proper sphere”).
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Part I of this Article provides background on standing and severability
doctrines, and describes established practice on the interaction between
standing and severability principles. Part II introduces the concepts of
claim-specific standing and supplemental standing, and considers why the
Court has recently insisted on the claim-specific approach. Part III argues
that the claim-specific standing theory is inconsistent with existing practice
on severability, and that applying the claim-specific theory to severability
would contradict the purposes of standing doctrine. Part IV contends that
the Court’s established approach to severability should be understood as a
form of supplemental standing. It also suggests that supplemental standing
explains accepted practice in other contexts. This Part concludes by
considering how the concept of supplemental standing could be
incorporated into standing doctrine as a more general matter.
I.

ESTABLISHED PRACTICE FOR STANDING AND SEVERABILITY

A. Standing
The basic contours of standing doctrine are well established, albeit
highly controversial.36 The Supreme Court has held that, at its core,
standing is a constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal
courts.37 Article III grants power to the federal courts only over “Cases”
and “Controversies,”38 and the Court’s view is that a dispute is an Article
III “Case” or “Controversy” only if the plaintiff has standing.39 The Court
has further held that a plaintiff has standing for constitutional purposes only
if (1) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury was caused
by the defendant, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
ruling.40 Because the Court views these requirements as constitutional in
character, Congress cannot eliminate them.41
The Court has identified two central purposes for standing doctrine.42
First, standing principles are meant to preserve the constitutional separation
of powers.43 The injury in fact requirement narrows the circumstances in
which the federal courts can exercise judicial review, and therefore
restrains the authority of the courts vis-à-vis the other branches of the
36

See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 11, at 466–67 (describing the “extensive controversy” that surrounds
standing law and collecting scholarly sources that criticize the doctrine).
37
See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341–42 (2006).
38
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39
Cuno, 547 U.S. at 342.
40
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
41
See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997).
42
See Re, supra note 11, at 1194.
43
See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013); Cuno, 547 U.S. at
341–42.
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federal government.44 Second, standing doctrine is supposed to promote
sound judicial decisions.45 The theory is that courts are best at deciding the
types of concrete disputes that have traditionally been viewed as “cases” or
“controversies.”46 Courts also rely heavily on the presentations of the
parties in the adversary system, and the injury in fact and causation
requirements help to ensure that the parties have a sufficient stake in a
dispute to frame the issues properly for the court.47
Even when the constitutional test for standing is satisfied, courts can
rely on additional, prudential considerations to limit the exercise of their
jurisdiction.48 These prudential standing principles include a general
prohibition on third-party standing, meaning that a plaintiff “generally must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”49 The Supreme Court has
stated that these prudential limitations also protect the separation of powers
and promote sound decisionmaking.50
Because prudential standing limitations are not imposed by the
Constitution, they are subject to exceptions.51 The general rule against
third-party standing, in particular, is not absolute. The Court has held that a
plaintiff can raise the rights of a third party when the plaintiff and the third
party have some relationship, and when it would be difficult for the third
party to assert his or her own rights.52 For example, when the prosecution
strikes prospective jurors based on their race, criminal defendants can raise
44

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–47.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007).
46
See id. at 516 (observing that the case-or-controversy requirement limits “the business of federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
resolution through the judicial process” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))); Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)
(explaining that the injury in fact requirement “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action”).
47
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (“At bottom, ‘the gist of the question of standing’ is whether
petitioners have ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
48
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86 (2013).
49
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
50
See id. at 498 (explaining that, in both its constitutional and prudential dimensions, standing
doctrine “is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a
democratic society”); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (observing that prudential standing
limitations also help to sharpen the issues and ensure that disputes are concrete and adverse).
51
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (explaining that “the relevant prudential factors that counsel
against hearing [a] case [can be] subject to ‘countervailing considerations’” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at
500–01)).
52
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–16
(1976)).
45
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an equal protection challenge that rests on the third-party rights of the
prospective jurors.53 Prudential standing limitations are also subject to
control by Congress, which can add to them, subtract from them, or
eliminate them altogether.54
Before considering how these constitutional and prudential standing
principles have traditionally been applied to severability questions, the next
section describes the fundamentals of severability doctrine.
B. Severability
Severability governs whether a statute that is partially unconstitutional
is invalid as a whole.55 It asks whether the unconstitutional part can,
metaphorically speaking, be “severed” from the remainder of the statute.
Under current severability doctrine,56 the “normal rule” is that the
unconstitutional part of a statute should be severed, and the remainder
should be left intact.57 Considerations of statutory interpretation and
legislative intent, however, can overcome that default rule.58 The principal
inquiry is whether Congress, had it been aware of the constitutional
problem, would have “preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at
all.”59 If Congress would have preferred what is left, the remainder is valid.
If it would have preferred no statute at all, the remainder is invalid.60
To understand how the intent-based theory of severability works,
consider a hypothetical. Suppose that Yellowstone National Park has been
overwhelmed by extreme levels of traffic and an endless series of protests
and counter-protests concerning federal environmental policies. Congress
enacts the following statute:

53

See id. at 415.
See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
55
See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 19, at 743.
56
This discussion focuses on the severability of federal statutes, which is a matter of federal law.
The severability of state statutes is primarily a matter of state law. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137,
139 (1996) (per curiam).
57
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010).
58
See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (explaining that the
“touchstone” for a severability ruling is “legislative intent,” and that “[a]fter finding an application or
portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left
of its statute to no statute at all?”).
59
Id. at 330. The Court also asks whether the remainder of the statute can “function[]
independently” of the unconstitutional part. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (quoting Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
60
See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330–31.
54

295

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Yellowstone Act
(1) Operating a private motor vehicle is prohibited within or in close
proximity to Yellowstone National Park. Any person who violates this
provision shall be fined $500.
(2) Protests concerning federal environmental policies are prohibited within
Yellowstone National Park. Any person who violates this provision shall be
fined $500.
(3) $10 million per year is appropriated to the National Park Service. Those
funds shall be used solely for the purpose of reporting to Congress on the
effects of § 1 and § 2 of this Act.

The private motor vehicle ban in § 1 is likely a constitutionally valid,
albeit seemingly imprudent, regulation of federal property to the extent that
it applies within Yellowstone; it might nevertheless exceed Congress’s
power to the extent that it applies outside the park.61 The protest ban in § 2
is an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech.62 And the
appropriation of funds in § 3 is a lawful exercise of Congress’s spending
power.63
Severability principles determine how an unconstitutional provision,
like the protest ban in § 2, affects the other provisions of the statute. The
intent-based approach asks whether Congress would have enacted the
remainder of the Yellowstone Act if it had been aware that the protest ban
in § 2 violated the First Amendment. If Congress would have enacted the
remainder—e.g., on the theory that traffic in Yellowstone was a serious
problem that should be addressed even apart from the ongoing protests—
the protest ban would be severable, and the other provisions of the Act
would be valid. But if the protest ban were such an integral part of the
statute that Congress would not have enacted the rest without it—e.g., on
the theory that a motor vehicle ban alone would lead to more protests and
make conditions at the park even worse—the remainder of the statute
would be invalid.
Severability questions can also arise with respect to different
applications of a single provision.64 In other words, a court can
metaphorically “sever” an unconstitutional application of a provision from
the remaining applications of that provision. For example, if the motor
vehicle ban in § 1 of the Yellowstone Act is unconstitutional as applied to
vehicles outside the park, severability principles determine whether § 1
61

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; cf. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (designating land
in the territories of Montana and Wyoming as Yellowstone National Park).
62
Cf. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 298–99 (1984) (upholding a
content-neutral regulation issued by the National Park Service against a First Amendment challenge).
63
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
64
See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 19, at 743–44.
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remains valid as applied to vehicles inside the park. This inquiry is
governed by the same intent-based test that applies to the severability of
provisions.65
Much like standing doctrine, the Supreme Court has justified existing
severability principles on the ground that they preserve the separation of
powers. The Court presumes that the unconstitutional part of a statute is
severable so that it can “limit the solution to the [constitutional] problem”
and avoid undue interference with the work of Congress.66 It is nonetheless
concerned that, when a court severs part of a statute that has a
constitutional flaw, it can resemble the “quintessentially legislative work”
of rewriting the statute.67 Severability doctrine ultimately balances these
separation of powers concerns by looking to the intent of Congress.68 If
Congress would have favored partial invalidation of a statute, a court
would not be engaging in improper legislative work by severing the
unconstitutional part of the statute. But if Congress would have favored
total invalidation, respect for the separation of powers would require
striking down the statute as a whole.69
In recent years, severability doctrine has become increasingly
important and controversial. For example, the Court’s severability decision
in United States v. Booker, which transformed the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines into an advisory scheme,70 sparked scholarship criticizing the
intent-based approach as overly speculative and subject to manipulation
based on judges’ policy preferences.71 Moreover, in its recent decision in
65

See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885–86
(2005); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997).
66
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006); see also id. at 329
(“[W]e try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is necessary, for we know that ‘[a] ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion))).
67
Id. at 329.
68
See id. at 330.
69
See id.; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (explaining that severance is
improper if it results in “legislation that Congress would not have enacted”); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2668 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that, if a court severs
a statute in a manner that contradicts Congress’s intent, the court “assumes the legislative function” and
“imposes on the Nation, by the Court’s decree, its own new statutory regime, consisting of policies,
risks, and duties that Congress did not enact,” which “can be a more extreme exercise of the judicial
power than striking the whole statute and allowing Congress to address the conditions that pertained
when the statute was considered at the outset”).
70
See 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
71
See Walsh, supra note 19, at 750 (observing that Booker was a “spur to critical evaluation of
severability doctrine” and citing recent scholarship on severability). See generally Tom Campbell,
Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011); Tobias A. Dorsey, Remark, Sense and
Severability, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 877 (2012). For earlier, similar critiques of severability, see, for
example, John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993), and Robert L. Stern,
Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1937).
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NFIB, the Court came within a single vote of invalidating the entire
Affordable Care Act (ACA) on inseverability grounds, and the dissent
bitterly criticized the majority for ruling that the statute was severable and
striking down only the portion of the statute that expanded the Medicaid
program.72 The dissent framed this criticism in separation of powers terms,
arguing that the Court had engaged in “vast judicial overreaching” by
severing the statute and “creat[ing] a debilitated, inoperable version of
health-care regulation that Congress did not enact and the public [did] not
expect.”73
Scholars who have criticized the intent-based theory of severability
have proposed a number of alternative approaches. A common proposal is
that statutes should be severed absent a clear statement to the contrary in
the statutory text.74 Other scholars have argued, in contrast, that statutes
should always be severed,75 or even that statutes should never be severed.76
Although these approaches would produce different results, they rest on the
same principle as current doctrine: respect for the separation of powers.77
Commentators disagree about how severability doctrine should give effect
to separation of powers interests in practice, but not that severability
doctrine should give effect to those interests in the first place.78
Recent controversy has centered on how severability issues should be
decided. In contrast, as the next section explains, the views of courts and
scholars on the threshold question of when courts have power to decide
severability issues—that is, how standing principles apply to severability—
have long been stable and largely uncontroversial.

72

See 132 S. Ct. at 2667–68, 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2676; see also id. at 2668 (arguing that the Court had taken “the ACA and this Nation in a
new direction and charts a course for federalism that the Court, not the Congress, has chosen,” even
though “under the Constitution, that power and authority do not rest with this Court”).
74
See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 71, at 254–58; Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and
the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 272 (2004); Walsh, supra note 19, at 784.
75
See Dorsey, supra note 71, at 891.
76
See Campbell, supra note 71, at 1496–97.
77
See Walsh, supra note 19, at 790 (recognizing that, “[a]t its core,” the debate over severability
“rests on judgments about how best to implement the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution”).
78
Compare, e.g., Campbell, supra note 71, at 1496 (arguing that “traditional separation of powers
principles” always require total invalidation on the theory that severance is an exercise of legislative
power because it involves rewriting the statute), with Walsh, supra note 19, at 790 (arguing that courts
should sever more statutes than under current doctrine because total invalidation is the greater intrusion
on the separation of powers).
73

298

109:285 (2015)

Supplemental Standing for Severability

C. Standing and Severability
Severability can arise in two postures, which this Article calls the “asapplied” posture and the “overbreadth” posture.79 To understand how
standing principles have traditionally applied to severability questions,
considering these postures separately is helpful.
1. As-Applied Posture.—In the as-applied posture, plaintiffs argue
that the part of a statute that applies to them is unconstitutional, and that
other parts of the statute are also invalid because the unconstitutional part
cannot be severed.80
To illustrate, suppose that a plaintiff, Speaker, challenges the
hypothetical Yellowstone Act.81 Speaker has concrete plans to protest
federal environmental policies within Yellowstone, but does not plan to
operate a private motor vehicle in or around the park. He is therefore
injured by the protest ban in § 2, but not by the motor vehicle ban in § 1 or
the appropriation of funds in § 3. In the as-applied posture, Speaker argues
that the provision of the statute that applies to him (the protest ban in § 2) is
unconstitutional because it is a content-based regulation of speech, and the
remainder of the Act is invalid because § 2 is inseverable. Speaker does not
need to prevail on his inseverability argument to secure relief on his
constitutional claim. Rather, severability arises only after Speaker prevails
under the Constitution.
The severability question in the as-applied posture can concern other
provisions of the same statute—as when Speaker argues that the protest ban
in § 2 is unconstitutional and inseverable from the rest of the statute. The
severability question in this posture can also concern other applications of
the same provision. For example, Speaker can argue that the protest ban is
unconstitutional as applied to him because he plans to engage in protected
speech, and that the protest ban is invalid as a whole because its
applications to protected speech are inseverable from its applications to
unprotected speech—e.g., protests involving incitement or defamation.82
This posture therefore covers both “facial” and “as-applied” constitutional
challenges. This Article nevertheless refers to it as the “as-applied” posture
because even when a challenge to a statutory provision is “facial,” a
plaintiff like Speaker is still arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as
79

Although some scholars have observed that severability questions can arise in different ways, the
literature has not systematically distinguished between these postures. See Vermeule, supra note 65, at
1951 (describing “severance proper” and “jus tertii severance” as two different “forms of severance”);
see also Nagle, supra note 71, at 208–09 (describing contexts in which severability questions can arise).
80
Cf. Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1951 (describing this posture as “severance proper”).
81
See supra Part I.B.
82
Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (describing traditionally unprotected
categories of speech).
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applied to him, albeit for a “facial” reason.83 In any event, the key defining
feature of this posture is that it is arguably unconstitutional to apply the
statute to the plaintiff, regardless of the outcome on the severability
question.
Established practice is that severability can always be decided in the
as-applied posture, and any potential standing concerns are immaterial.
That means the court in Speaker’s case can rule on severability after
deciding that the protest ban is unconstitutional, even though the other
provisions of the Yellowstone Act do not injure Speaker.
All nine Justices recently appeared to follow this approach in NFIB.
The plaintiffs argued that the entire ACA was invalid on inseverability
grounds.84 The government objected that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge, on the basis of inseverability, statutory provisions that did not
apply to them.85 For example, the plaintiff States were injured by the
expansion of the Medicaid program, but not by the other provisions that
they sought to invalidate, such as the requirement that insurance coverage
be provided without regard for preexisting health conditions.86
After concluding that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional,
however, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion did not mention the
standing issue. It instead proceeded directly to consider (and reject) the
States’ inseverability claim on the merits.87 Justice Ginsburg’s separate
opinion similarly concluded that the statute was severable without
addressing standing.88 The dissent, for its part, expressly rejected the
government’s standing argument, relying on both past practice and
pragmatic concerns.89 Because the Court was obligated to consider whether
the requirements of Article III were satisfied before addressing the merits,90
it is doubtful that the Justices in the majority overlooked the question of
standing. Rather, the natural conclusion is that the five Justices in the
83

As Professor Fallon has explained, “In order to raise a constitutional objection to a statute, a
litigant must always assert that the statute’s application to her case violates the Constitution.” Fallon,
supra note 32, at 1327. A court can use a doctrinal test that “marks the statute as unenforceable in its
totality,” and thus renders the statute “facially invalid.” See id. at 1327–28. But “[a]s-applied challenges
are [still] the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.” Id. at 1328.
84
See, e.g., Brief for State Petitioners on Severability at 27–29, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos.
11-393 & 11-400), 2012 WL 72454, at *27–29.
85
See Brief for Respondents (Severability) at 14–16, 24–25, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393 &
11-400), 2012 WL 273133, at *14–16, *24–25.
86
See id. at *22, *24–25; see also Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1244 (11th Cir. 2011).
87
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (plurality opinion).
88
See id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
89
See id. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
90
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998).
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majority agreed with the four Justices in dissent that standing simply did
not pose an obstacle to a ruling on severability.
That conclusion is consistent with previous practice. The Court has
decided numerous severability questions after ruling that a statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff,91 without addressing whether the
plaintiff had standing to raise severability.92 These decisions have often
used language suggesting that courts always have the power to decide
severability questions in this posture.93 Recent scholarship on severability
similarly asserts or assumes that severability can be decided even when it
affects only parts of the statute that do not injure the plaintiff.94
The Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. is a particularly striking example of established
practice in the as-applied posture.95 That case concerned 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471(b), which granted jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts over a broad
range of civil proceedings.96 Northern Pipeline filed an action against
Marathon Pipe Line in bankruptcy court for, inter alia, breach of contract.97
A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, concluded that
§ 1471(b) was unconstitutional as a whole—both because its broad grant of
jurisdiction to Article I bankruptcy judges violated Article III and because
its unconstitutional application to Northern’s contract claims against

91

In some of these cases, the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute was the defendant
in an enforcement action, as noted when particular cases are discussed. Generally, however, this Article
refers to the party challenging a statute as the “plaintiff” for simplicity.
92
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010);
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–31 (2006); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186–87 (1992).
93
See, e.g., Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (“After finding an application or portion of a statute
unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no
statute at all?”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186 (similar).
94
See Walsh, supra note 22, at 76–77 (arguing that, if a court rules that the statutory provision that
injures the plaintiff is unconstitutional, the court can decide whether that provision is severable from
other provisions that do not injure the plaintiff); see also, e.g., Dorf, supra note 22, at 305 (“Upon
finding a law unconstitutional, a court must do its best to implement the remaining will of the very
legislature that enacted the invalid law . . . .”); David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 652 (2008) (criticizing the Court for sometimes “ignor[ing] its obligation
to apply the doctrine” of severability); Ryan Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability,
91 TEX. L. REV. 543, 598 (2013) (arguing that Article III limits how to answer severability questions
because it prohibits a court from excessively rewriting a statute, but assuming that Article III does not
limit when a court can answer severability questions). Professor Nagle noted in passing that severability
questions can implicate standing concerns, but did not develop this point. Nagle, supra note 71, at 209–
10 n.30.
95
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
96
Id. at 54 (plurality opinion).
97
See id. at 56.
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Marathon could not be severed from its other applications.98 Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Court should hold
§ 1471(b) unconstitutional only as applied to Northern’s claims against
Marathon.99 Justice Rehnquist nevertheless agreed that the Court should
hold § 1471(b) invalid in its entirety because its applications to different
types of claims were inseverable.100 Thus, even though the statute’s
applications to other types of claims had no effect on the parties, the Court
invalidated all of those applications on inseverability grounds.
This practice of deciding severability in the as-applied posture seems
to rest, at least in part, on the common assumption that severability is a
“remedial” question. The Supreme Court and the academic literature have
described severability as remedial because it affects the scope of the
remedy that a court will provide for a constitutional violation.101 Indeed, all
of the Justices adopted that characterization in NFIB.102 The reasoning
seems to be that, if severability arises only in the remedial phase, after
standing and the merits have already been considered, any additional
standing analysis of severability is unnecessary.
That is not to say, however, that existing practice requires courts to
make a severability decision when they rule in a plaintiff’s favor on a
constitutional challenge. Courts often do not even mention severability.103
That is perhaps because there is little doubt that the statute would be
98

See id. at 87 & n.40 (reasoning that, at the least, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
Northern’s “state-law contract claim against Marathon,” and that this application could not be severed
from the application to other claims).
99
See id. at 89–91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
100
See id. at 91–92.
101
See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–31 (2006)
(repeatedly characterizing the question of severability as one of “remedy”); id. at 328 (severability is
about “limit[ing] the solution to the problem”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005)
(describing severability analysis as a “question that concerns the remedy”); Dorf, supra note 22, at 324
(describing severance as “the remedy for partial invalidation” of statutes); Dorsey, supra note 71, at 891
(describing severability as a “judicial remedy”); Gans, supra note 94, at 643 (“[Severability] asks a
remedial question about the scope of the relief a court should order . . . .”). In fact, David Gans has
argued that severability is “part of the federal common law of constitutional remedies,” and that the
current test for severability is misplaced because it turns on substantive questions of statutory
interpretation and legislative intent rather than remedial considerations. See id. at 643–45.
102
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (plurality opinion) (describing severability as a “decision
about remedy” (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330)); id. at 2630, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (characterizing severability as a question
regarding the “appropriate remedy”); id. at 2667 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(agreeing that the question of how much of the Medicaid expansion to invalidate on severability
grounds was a “question of remedy”).
103
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (not addressing
severability after holding that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional); Shelby County
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (not addressing severability after holding that § 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional).
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severable, particularly in light of the presumption in favor of severance
under current law.104 Courts also sometimes note that they are not deciding
severability because the parties did not raise it.105 The result in these cases
is to leave the severability issue open for resolution in a subsequent case.
Moreover, even when the parties raise the issue and the proper
resolution is unclear, the Court has sometimes concluded that it would be
inappropriate to make a severability ruling in the as-applied posture. But
these decisions have declined to address severability on what appeared to
be prudential grounds, rather than constitutional ones. For example, in
Printz v. United States, the Court held that the provisions of federal law
that required state officers to conduct background checks in connection
with handgun purchases were unconstitutional on anticommandeering
grounds.106 The plaintiff officers also argued that additional provisions of
the statute that applied to firearm dealers and purchasers were invalid on
inseverability grounds.107 The Court decided not to answer that severability
question because no firearm dealers or purchasers were parties to the
case.108 It did not mention standing doctrine, and instead stated only that it
“decline[d] to speculate regarding the rights and obligations of parties not
before the Court.”109 Particularly in light of its many rulings on severability
in the as-applied posture, this language suggests that the Court declined to
decide severability for prudential, third-party standing reasons. In other
words, the Court felt no obligation to rule on severability, but it did not
question its power to make such a ruling if there were important reasons to
do so. The Court has similarly appeared to rely on prudential reasoning to
avoid rulings on severability in other cases.110
Thus, under current practice, courts always have the power to rule on
severability questions in the as-applied posture, even if they do not affect
any part of the statute that applies to the plaintiff. Courts can nonetheless
104

See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329.
See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001); Sable Commc’ns of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 n.6 (1989).
106
See 521 U.S. 898, 902, 933 (1997).
107
See id. at 935.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 549 (exercising “discretion and prudential judgment” in
declining to decide a severability issue that had not been briefed); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 625–26 (1996) (plurality opinion) (appearing to decline to address
severability on prudential grounds); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–
78 (1995) (reversing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling of inseverability on what appeared to be the prudential
ground that it was unnecessary to reach the severability question); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
649 n.6 (1984) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that it would be improper to decide a severability
question that concerned only the validity of a statutory provision that did not injure the plaintiffs before
the Court, but framing this conclusion in terms of both Article III power and prudential restraint).
105
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decline to decide severability questions in this posture on prudential
grounds—including that the parties have not raised the issue of
severability, or that it concerns only the rights of third parties.
2. Overbreadth Posture.—Unlike the as-applied posture, plaintiffs in
the overbreadth posture do not argue that the part of the statute that applies
to them is unconstitutional. Rather, they argue that, even if the part of the
statute that applies to them is constitutional, that part is invalid because
some other part of the statute is unconstitutional and cannot be severed.111
To illustrate, consider again the hypothetical Yellowstone Act,112 and
suppose that a different plaintiff, Biker, challenges the Act. Biker has
concrete plans to ride her motorcycle in Yellowstone, but not to protest.
She is therefore injured by the motor vehicle ban in § 1, but not by the
protest ban in § 2 or the appropriation of funds in § 3. In the overbreadth
posture, Biker argues that the motor vehicle ban is invalid because the
protest ban in § 2 is both unconstitutional and inseverable. Plaintiffs in this
posture, like Biker, need to prevail on both their constitutional argument
and their inseverability argument to secure relief.
The severability question in the overbreadth posture can concern other
provisions of the same statute—for example, Biker’s claim that the protest
ban in § 2 is unconstitutional as a whole and inseverable from the motor
vehicle ban in § 1. The severability question can also concern other
applications of the same provision. For example, Biker can argue that, even
if the motor vehicle ban is constitutional as applied to her because she plans
to ride her motorcycle inside Yellowstone, the ban is unconstitutional as
applied to vehicles outside the park, and those unconstitutional applications
cannot be severed. The key defining feature of this posture is that the
provision or application of the statute that injures the plaintiff is invalid
only if the statute is inseverable.
Referring to this as the overbreadth posture reflects that these claims
are analogous to First Amendment overbreadth claims. Overbreadth
doctrine permits a plaintiff to obtain relief when a statute has a substantial
number of applications that violate the First Amendment, even if a more
narrowly drawn statute could be constitutionally applied to the plaintiff.113
111

Cf. Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1951 (describing this posture as “jus tertii severance”).
See supra Part I.B.
113
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (explaining that “[i]n the First
Amendment context,” a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep” (quoting Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008))); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (explaining that the First Amendment permits “attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity” (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486 (1965))).
112
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That means a plaintiff can, in effect, invoke the constitutional rights of
third parties to obtain relief.114 For example, suppose that a plaintiff wants
to engage in an obscene protest inside Yellowstone. Even though obscene
speech is constitutionally unprotected, the plaintiff could challenge the
protest ban in § 2 of the Yellowstone Act as overbroad because it applies
primarily to the protected speech of third parties.115 That claim is
comparable to Biker’s inseverability claim. Biker effectively argues that
the protest ban is unconstitutional as applied to third parties, and that she
should prevail even if a more narrowly drawn statute would be
constitutional—e.g., a statute that includes the motor vehicle ban, but not
the protest ban. For these reasons, scholars have recognized that
inseverability arguments in this posture are analogous to overbreadth
arguments.116
Existing practice with respect to a court’s power to rule on severability
in the overbreadth posture is somewhat less clear than in the as-applied
posture. Some recent circuit court decisions and scholarship on severability
have asserted that inseverability claims in the overbreadth posture are
inconsistent with Article III standing principles.117 But the position of the
Supreme Court, consistent with the more common view in the academic
literature, appears to be that inseverability claims in the overbreadth
posture are permitted under Article III. These claims are therefore subject,
at most, to prudential limitations on third-party standing.
The Supreme Court has, albeit rarely, ruled on the merits of
severability questions that arose in the overbreadth posture. For example, in
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, the plaintiff airlines challenged provisions of
§ 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act.118 The plaintiffs did not argue that the
provisions that injured them were unconstitutional. Instead, they argued
that the legislative veto provision in § 43(f)—which did not injure them—
114

See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610–12.
See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468, 473.
116
See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 30 at 368–70 (recognizing that overbreadth challenges and
challenges raising inseverability questions are analogous); Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1967
(“Overbreadth . . . functions as a doctrine of nonseverability.”); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 423–24, 438–40 (1974) (observing that an inseverability argument is
analogous to an overbreadth argument).
117
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Tex., Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 2011)
(holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to argue that provisions that did not injure them were
unconstitutional and inseverable); CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257,
1270–74 (11th Cir. 2006) (similar); Walsh, supra note 22, at 75–77 (arguing that a plaintiff lacks
standing to argue that a statutory provision that does not apply to him is unconstitutional and
inseverable); see also Campbell, supra note 71, at 1503 (stating that a plaintiff “lacks standing; end of
argument” in this posture); Dorsey, supra note 71, at 889 (asserting that a challenge in this posture does
not “make[] any sense”); Fish, supra note 23, at 50 n.146 (assuming that inseverability generally cannot
be raised in this posture).
118
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was unconstitutional and inseverable from the remainder of § 43.119 The
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs on the merits and severed the legislative
veto provision.120 But the Court never suggested that the plaintiffs faced a
standing problem. It instead appeared to assume that the plaintiffs had
Article III standing to challenge the provisions that injured them, and that
they could therefore challenge those provisions on inseverability
grounds.121 In other decisions, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
have similarly ruled on the merits of severability questions in the
overbreadth posture.122
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine also confirms that plaintiffs
raising inseverability claims in this posture do not face any sort of special
Article III standing problem. It is commonly understood that First
Amendment overbreadth claims are consistent with Article III, and that
overbreadth is an exception only to prudential limitations on third-party
standing.123 In other words, when a plaintiff is injured by a statute, the
plaintiff has Article III standing to challenge it, including by raising an
overbreadth claim. And even if the court rejects that claim on the ground
119

See id. at 683.
See id. at 697.
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Professor Walsh has observed that the plaintiffs in Alaska Airlines also challenged
administrative regulations that had been issued pursuant to § 43, and that those regulations were subject
to the legislative veto provision in § 43(f). See Walsh, supra note 22, at 75–76. It might therefore have
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regulations were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, viewed the severability question as
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§ 43, rather than to the regulations. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 680 (“[Plaintiffs] contend that
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that the statute is not overbroad, that is a ruling on the merits, not a ruling
that the plaintiff lacks standing. For example, in Virginia v. Hicks, the
Supreme Court explained that deciding whether a statute is overbroad is not
a decision on standing, but instead “the determination of a First
Amendment challenge on the merits.”124
As decisions such as Alaska Airlines reflect, Article III applies in the
same way to a plaintiff raising an inseverability claim in the overbreadth
posture. If the plaintiff is injured by the statute, the plaintiff has Article III
standing to challenge it, including by raising an inseverability claim.
Scholars have therefore described inseverability, like overbreadth, as an
exception to limitations on third-party standing.125 In fact, some have gone
even further, arguing that plaintiffs in the overbreadth posture are not
asserting the rights of third parties at all, and are instead asserting their own
right not to be penalized under an invalid statute.126 Either way, these
scholars agree that plaintiffs in this posture have Article III standing,
whether they are raising an overbreadth claim or an inseverability claim.
And even if a court rejects an inseverability claim on the ground that the
statute is severable, that is also a ruling on the merits, rather than a ruling
that the plaintiff lacks standing.
Indeed, it would be odd if a plaintiff had Article III standing to raise an
overbreadth claim, but lacked Article III standing to raise an inseverability
claim. The test for Article III standing is centered on the injury in fact
requirement, and whether plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact does not
depend on which substantive arguments they raise.127 To be sure, if the
Court adopted then-Professor Fletcher’s proposal to abandon the injury in
fact test and treat standing as a question of the merits, standing would
depend on which substantive argument the plaintiff raises.128 Rather than
accept this invitation to restructure standing doctrine, however, the Court
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539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003) (brackets omitted) (quoting Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958–59 (1984)).
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See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 83, at 1348–49, 1360–61, 1369 (observing that, if a statute is
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See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78–79 (1978).
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has remained committed to the injury in fact requirement.129 Under current
practice, therefore, a plaintiff who suffers an injury in fact from a statute
has Article III standing to raise both overbreadth and inseverability.130
It is true that inseverability and overbreadth are not identical.
Overbreadth provides special protection for speech rights on the theory that
those rights are particularly prone to chilling effects from expansively
written statutes.131 It permits a statute to be struck down in its entirety if it
covers too much protected speech, even if the statute’s applications are
severable as a matter of legislative intent.132 Overbreadth is therefore a way
to overcome the severability of a statute when the freedom of speech is at
stake.
Inseverability and overbreadth nevertheless have the same effect in the
posture considered here. Both permit a plaintiff whose own conduct is not
constitutionally privileged to challenge a statute because it covers conduct
that is constitutionally privileged.133 Thus, if a plaintiff like Biker succeeds
on an inseverability claim, resort to an overbreadth claim is unnecessary,
and vice versa. From the perspective of Article III standing doctrine,
therefore, inseverability claims in this posture are equivalent to First
Amendment overbreadth claims.
It is also true that overbreadth claims are typically directed at the
applications of a single provision, whereas an inseverability claim can be
directed at different provisions. Although that might make a difference for
purposes of prudential standing rules, it should not make a difference for
purposes of Article III. For example, if Biker argues that the protest ban is
unconstitutional and inseverable from the motor vehicle ban, she is still
seeking to redress her injury from the motor vehicle ban. She therefore has
Article III standing for this claim. Indeed, given that Congress cannot
revise constitutional standing principles,134 it would be counterintuitive if
Biker’s Article III standing turned on whether Congress chose to codify the
motor vehicle ban and the protest ban in separate provisions. That choice
might, however, affect the application of third-party standing rules, which
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See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992).
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(2003).
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Congress can alter.135 A court could reasonably be more cautious, as a
prudential matter, when a plaintiff like Biker seeks a ruling on the
constitutionality of a provision that does not apply to her. Such a claim
could easily be in tension with the separation of powers and sound
decisionmaking interests that standing doctrine is meant to serve.
Claims in the overbreadth posture also seem to be rare in practice.136
But they do happen,137 and their infrequency does not mean that the
overbreadth posture is inconsistent with Article III.138 One explanation for
the rarity of claims in the overbreadth posture is that severability can
always be raised in the as-applied posture, so litigants have not needed to
use the overbreadth posture to obtain rulings on severability. Another is
that severability is often described as a “remedial” question when it arises
in the as-applied posture.139 That may have caused litigants simply to
overlook that severability can also be raised in the overbreadth posture, in
which it operates more like a merits question.140
*

*

*

There is a basic symmetry between established practice for
severability in the as-applied posture and the overbreadth posture. In both
postures, Article III allows plaintiffs to raise severability questions. But
courts are not required to decide severability questions in either posture,
and instead can limit their consideration of severability issues based on
prudential standing principles, including third-party standing rules.
Existing practice on severability, however, has not yet taken account
of a recent development in the law of standing—the Supreme Court’s
categorical adoption of a claim-specific approach. Before considering how
that approach applies to severability in Part III, Part II introduces the claimspecific approach and an alternative approach that the Court could have
adopted—supplemental standing.
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II. CLAIM-SPECIFIC STANDING VS. SUPPLEMENTAL STANDING
Setting aside for now the question of severability, suppose that Biker
challenges the hypothetical Yellowstone Act and argues that both the motor
vehicle ban in § 1 and the protest ban in § 2 are unconstitutional. How
should the court proceed given that Biker is injured only by the motor
vehicle ban?
The Supreme Court has adopted a claim-specific approach to standing
that requires plaintiffs to have Article III standing for every claim that they
raise.141 Under that approach, Biker would be viewed as raising two claims
because she is challenging two provisions as unconstitutional.142 Biker
would therefore be required to establish standing for both claims—meaning
that she would need to demonstrate that both provisions injure her.143
Because she is injured only by the motor vehicle ban, she would have
standing to challenge only that provision, and the court could not decide
whether the protest ban is unconstitutional.
This Part lays the groundwork for scrutinizing this claim-specific
approach to standing. It first explains that the text of Article III does not
require a claim-specific approach, and instead also permits the more
flexible concept of “supplemental standing.” It then explores the decisions
in which the Court has nonetheless adopted the claim-specific theory and
rejected the supplemental-standing approach.
A. The Text of Article III Permits Claim-Specific Standing or
Supplemental Standing
Even assuming that an Article III “case” or “controversy” exists only
if the plaintiff has standing, the text of Article III does not specify how the
standing requirement should apply in cases involving multiple claims. It is
possible to interpret “case” narrowly—as the claim-specific approach
effectively does—to include only claims that the plaintiff has standing to
raise.144 Under that interpretation, the injury in fact requirement both
defines when a case exists, and establishes the outer boundaries of a case
for purposes of Article III.
Although that interpretation is possible, it is not textually required.
Article III can also support a broader interpretation of a “case” that would
permit a plaintiff to assert multiple claims, even if only one of those claims
satisfies the test for standing. Under this approach, standing would still be
necessary to give rise to an Article III case. But such a case could also
141
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See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733–34 (2008).
143
See id.
144
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include other claims that the plaintiff would lack standing to bring on their
own. That means the injury in fact requirement would still define when a
case exists, but would not establish the outer boundaries of a case under
Article III.
This broader interpretation of an Article III “case” is not purely
theoretical. The Supreme Court has long embraced an analogous
interpretation of an Article III “case” under the doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction. Article III grants the federal courts power over “Cases” and
“Controversies” that fall within nine categories of subject-matter
jurisdiction, including cases arising under federal law, and controversies in
which the parties are diverse.145 But it is well established that a case can
include claims that do not themselves fall within one of these nine
categories. The Court held, in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
that a court with jurisdiction over a federal claim can also exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, even if the parties are not
diverse.146 The federal and state law claims fall within the same
constitutional “case,” the Court explained, if they arise from a “common
nucleus of operative fact.”147 Thus, the categories in Article III define when
a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, but the “common nucleus of
operative fact” standard defines which claims fall within the boundaries of
such a case.
The text of Article III could also support a similar “supplemental
standing” approach.148 The central principle of supplemental standing
would be that, if a plaintiff had standing for one claim, the plaintiff’s
Article III case could also include claims that would not themselves satisfy
the test for standing. Again, standing would still define when a
constitutional case exists. But some criterion other than standing—perhaps,
for example, the Gibbs standard of a common nucleus of operative fact—
would define the outer limits of the case.
In fact, this supplemental-standing approach not only is textually
permissible, but also is ultimately more faithful to the text than a claimspecific approach to standing. Article III speaks in terms of “cases,” not
“claims.” That suggests federal jurisdiction should be determined on a
case-specific basis, rather than a claim-specific basis—as the Court has
long held for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction.
145
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The Supreme Court has nevertheless adopted a claim-specific
approach to standing, and recently rejected the concept of supplemental
standing. The Court has not argued that a claim-specific theory of standing
is textually required, or even preferred by the text. Instead, as the next
section explains, the Court initially appeared to adopt the claim-specific
approach almost by accident, and has since attempted to justify it based on
past practice and functional considerations.
B. The Supreme Court Has Adopted Claim-Specific Standing and
Rejected Supplemental Standing
1. Early Decisions.—In the 1970s, at about the same time that it
began to embrace the injury in fact requirement as part of standing
doctrine,149 the Court began to adopt a claim-specific approach to standing
that required plaintiffs to establish an injury in fact for every claim that
they raised. For several decades, the Court provided little justification for
this approach, and instead presented it almost as a fait accompli.
The claim-specific approach to standing can be traced to Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis.150 In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff had standing
to challenge a fraternal club’s policy regarding the service of guests
because the club had refused to serve the plaintiff based on his race.151 But
the plaintiff could not, the Court held, challenge the club’s membership
policy because he had never sought to become a member, and the
membership policy therefore had not injured him.152 Although that holding
appeared to assume that standing is claim-specific, the Court did not make
that assumption explicit. Nor did it address the text of Article III or the
possibility of supplemental standing.
A decade later, in Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court similarly held that a
group of plaintiffs had standing for some of their claims, but not others.153
In particular, the plaintiff Medicaid patients were allowed to challenge
decisions by nursing homes to transfer them to a lower level of care, but
not decisions to transfer them to a higher level of care.154 The Court
asserted that “a plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one
kind [does not] possess[] by virtue of that injury the necessary stake in
litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not
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been subject.”155 That assertion appears to embrace a claim-specific
approach to standing. But the Court did not explain why such an approach
was required, and instead merely cited Moose Lodge.
Shortly thereafter, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court extended
the claim-specific approach to the remedial context and held, without
explanation, that plaintiffs must have Article III standing for every remedy
that they seek.156 The Los Angeles police had stopped the plaintiff in Lyons
for a traffic violation and, without provocation, applied a chokehold that
rendered him unconscious.157 The plaintiff sued for both damages and an
injunction against the future use of chokeholds.158 The Court acknowledged
that the plaintiff had standing to seek damages for his injuries, but held that
he lacked standing to seek an injunction because the threat that the police
would choke him again was too remote.159 It thus assumed that the plaintiff
was required to establish standing for both types of relief. Justice White’s
majority opinion did not cite any authority for that assumption—even
though Justice Marshall’s dissent disputed it and argued that separate
standing was not required for the injunctive claim.160
Several years later, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court held that the claimspecific approach to standing also limits the scope of the remedy that a
court can provide for a constitutional violation.161 The plaintiff prisoners in
Lewis alleged that the law libraries in their prisons were inadequate.162 The
district court agreed, and entered an injunction that required the State of
Arizona to provide better services for prisoners on “lockdown” status,
illiterate prisoners, and non-English-speaking prisoners.163 The Supreme
Court held that the scope of the injunction exceeded the district court’s
authority under Article III.164 The only cognizable injury the plaintiffs had
established, the Court held, was caused by the failure to provide special
services for illiterate inmates.165 Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that
“standing is not dispensed in gross,” and relied on Blum for the proposition
that standing to challenge one form of conduct does not imply standing to
challenge a different form of conduct.166
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2. Recent Developments.—Although the Supreme Court applied a
claim-specific approach to standing in Moose Lodge, Blum, Lyons, and
Lewis, those decisions did not address the potential concept of
supplemental standing, and thus did not expressly reject it. Those decisions
also left open several questions regarding the claim-specific approach to
standing, including how it would apply in constitutional challenges to
statutes. The Court has recently addressed these potential sources of
uncertainty.
The Court categorically dismissed the concept of supplemental
standing in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno.167 The plaintiffs in that case
asserted a Commerce Clause challenge against state and municipal tax
benefits that had been granted to DaimlerChrysler pursuant to state statutes
in Ohio.168 The Court held that, even assuming the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the municipal tax benefits, they could not challenge the state tax
benefits, which did not cause them a sufficient injury.169 Standing was not
“commutative,” the Court decided, and concepts drawn from the doctrine
of supplemental jurisdiction could not be used to define an Article III
“case” for purposes of standing analysis.170
Cuno asserted that its rejection of supplemental standing was dictated,
at least in part, by past practice. It relied on decisions such as Lyons and
Lewis for the proposition that standing is claim-specific.171 The Court also
asserted that it had “never” previously permitted “a federal court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy
those elements of the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing,
that serve to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process.”172
Perhaps because its prior decisions had not directly addressed the
concept of supplemental standing, the Court in Cuno also offered its own
functional justification for rejecting that concept in favor of the claimspecific approach.173 According to the Court, the claim-specific approach
reinforces the purposes of standing doctrine, including the separation of
powers.174 It expressed concern that, if plaintiffs were not required to have
167
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standing for every claim, they could easily evade the limits of Article III.
Courts would be permitted to “decid[e] issues they would not otherwise be
authorized to decide,” and a litigant could, “by virtue of his standing to
challenge one government action, challenge other governmental actions
that did not injure him.”175 In those circumstances, the separation of powers
“would quickly erode,” and the Court’s “emphasis on the standing
requirement’s role in maintaining this separation would be rendered hollow
rhetoric.”176
Cuno also helped to clarify how the claim-specific approach to
standing applies when a plaintiff challenges multiple statutory provisions as
unconstitutional. The Court treated the plaintiffs’ challenge to the
municipal tax benefits and their challenge to the state tax benefits as
separate “claims” for purposes of the claim-specific analysis.177 It therefore
appeared to conclude that plaintiffs must establish standing for each
provision of a statute that they challenge. In other words, the Court
suggested that a “claim” for purposes of the claim-specific approach to
standing is defined on a provision-specific basis, rather than some other
basis, such as a statute-specific one.
The Court confirmed that conclusion in Davis v. FEC.178 In that case,
the plaintiff argued that two provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 violated the First Amendment.179 Section 319(a) relaxed the
limits on campaign contributions for congressional candidates whose
opponents expended personal funds above a certain threshold, and § 319(b)
required self-financing candidates to make disclosures about their
expenditures.180 The Court reaffirmed the claim-specific approach to
standing and, consistent with Cuno, held that the plaintiff was required to
establish standing for each provision that he challenged.181 It ultimately
concluded that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both provisions.182
In sum, the Court recently adopted the claim-specific approach to
standing as a categorical matter, and asserted that this approach is both
consistent with existing practice and necessary to advance the purposes of
standing doctrine. As the next section explains, however, the manner in
which the Court has applied the claim-specific approach in constitutional
challenges to statutes would conflict with existing practice on severability,
175
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and would ultimately undermine the objectives of standing doctrine in
severability cases.
III. CLAIM-SPECIFIC STANDING AND SEVERABILITY
Both of the Supreme Court’s rationales for the claim-specific approach
to standing—consistency with past practice, and reinforcing the aims of
standing doctrine—break down in the context of severability doctrine. In
fact, the claim-specific approach to standing conflicts with established
practice on severability. Under current practice, if a plaintiff has standing to
challenge a statute, Article III always permits a ruling on severability in
both the as-applied and overbreadth postures. The plaintiff need not, in
other words, make an additional showing of standing to raise an argument
about severability. But the claim-specific approach would treat severability
in the as-applied posture as an independent claim that the plaintiff would
need standing to raise—which means that Article III would often prevent a
court from ruling on severability in the as-applied posture. At the same
time, the claim-specific approach would not impose that constitutional
limitation in the overbreadth posture. The result would be an unexpected
asymmetry: Article III standing principles would make it harder to rule on
severability in the as-applied posture than in the overbreadth posture.
These changes to established practice on severability would contradict
the purposes of standing doctrine. Preventing severability rulings in the asapplied posture would interfere with the separation of powers because a
ruling on severability is often necessary to give effect to Congress’s intent.
It would also do little, if anything, to advance the interest in sound
decisionmaking. Moreover, the claim-specific approach would allow
rulings in the overbreadth posture, even though that posture is far more
suspect from the perspective of standing principles because it permits
plaintiffs to challenge provisions that do not even apply to them. Although
existing practice also allows claims in the overbreadth posture, the claimspecific approach would channel more severability claims into the
overbreadth posture because the as-applied posture could no longer serve
as an outlet for severability rulings. In the process, it would do considerable
damage to the interests in the separation of powers and accurate judicial
decisions.
A. Claim-Specific Standing Conflicts with Practice on Severability
1. Severability Is Sometimes a Claim.—The claim-specific approach
requires plaintiffs to have standing for every claim that they raise. The
Supreme Court’s decisions adopting that approach—as well as background
standing theory—make clear that an argument about severability is a
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separate claim that requires standing in the as-applied posture, but not in
the overbreadth posture.
To understand how the claim-specific approach to standing works in
the as-applied posture, consider Speaker and our hypothetical Yellowstone
Act.183 Suppose initially that Speaker argues that (1) the protest ban is
unconstitutional, and (2) the motor vehicle ban is unconstitutional. If
Speaker prevailed on both arguments, the court would invalidate both
provisions. Under Cuno and Davis, however, Speaker must have Article III
standing for each provision that he challenges. Because he is not injured by
the motor vehicle ban, he cannot argue that it is unconstitutional, and the
court cannot strike it down.
Now suppose that Speaker argues that (1) the protest ban is
unconstitutional, and (2) the motor vehicle ban is invalid because the
protest ban cannot be severed. If Speaker prevailed on both arguments, the
effect would be the same as above: The court would invalidate both
provisions. The claim-specific standing analysis should therefore be the
same. It would treat Speaker as raising two claims—a constitutional
challenge to the protest ban, and an inseverability challenge to the motor
vehicle ban—and he would need standing for each. Because he is not
injured by the motor vehicle ban, Speaker could not argue that it is invalid
on inseverability grounds. Thus, the court would be barred, as a
constitutional matter, from ruling on severability.
To be sure, Cuno and Davis did not directly address inseverability
arguments, and instead addressed arguments that multiple provisions were
unconstitutional.184 But it is hard to see why that distinction should make a
difference. If the claim-specific approach requires Speaker to have standing
to argue that the motor vehicle ban is invalid because it is unconstitutional,
it also would seem to require Speaker to have standing to argue that the
motor vehicle ban is invalid on any other ground, including inseverability.
Indeed, the Court’s principal concern in adopting the claim-specific
standing theory has been to prevent plaintiffs from invalidating statutory
provisions or government actions that do not injure them185—which is
exactly the effect of Speaker’s inseverability argument. A faithful
application of the claim-specific approach would therefore prohibit a court

183
184

See supra Part I.B.
See Davis, 554 U.S. at 736, 740, 744; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338–39

(2006).
185

See, e.g., Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 & n.5 (holding that a plaintiff cannot, “by virtue of his standing
to challenge one government action, challenge other governmental actions that did not injure him”);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge only the
“particular inadequacy in government administration” that caused their injury, as opposed to “all
inadequacies in that administration”).
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from ruling on the severability question in Speaker’s case in the as-applied
posture.
The application of the claim-specific approach would lead to a
different conclusion in the overbreadth posture. To understand why,
consider Biker’s challenge to the Yellowstone Act. Biker argues that the
motor vehicle ban in § 1 is invalid because the protest ban in § 2 is
unconstitutional and inseverable. As explained earlier, even though Biker is
not injured by the protest ban, existing practice on both severability and
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine grants her Article III standing to
raise that argument.186
The claim-specific approach to standing would do nothing to change
that conclusion. Even under that approach, Biker is effectively raising only
a single claim—that the motor vehicle ban is invalid. It happens that her
substantive theory for why the motor vehicle is invalid involves arguments
about the constitutionality and severability of the protest ban. But those
arguments are still directed toward redressing Biker’s injury from the
motor vehicle ban. She therefore has Article III standing to raise them, just
as she would have Article III standing to argue that the motor vehicle ban is
unconstitutional. And it makes no difference for constitutional purposes
whether she is injured by the protest ban. Although she might face a
prudential, third-party standing problem when raising an inseverability
claim concerning the protest ban, she would not face an Article III standing
problem.
Any other conclusion would cast substantial doubt on the continued
viability of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. As explained earlier, it
is well established that overbreadth claims are consistent with Article III
and are at most an exception to prudential limitations on third-party
standing.187 And Biker’s inseverability claim is equivalent to an
overbreadth claim for standing purposes. The claim-specific approach to
standing therefore could not impose Article III limitations on Biker’s
inseverability claim—i.e., by requiring her to show an injury in fact from
the protest ban—without imposing similar limitations on overbreadth
claims. But the Court’s claim-specific standing decisions do not suggest
that they are in any way inconsistent with existing overbreadth doctrine.
In fact, Cuno strongly suggested that the claim-specific approach to
standing does not affect the theory underlying overbreadth claims (or
inseverability claims in the overbreadth posture). The Court took care to
state that it was not displacing lower court decisions holding that, if a
plaintiff has standing to challenge government action, the plaintiff “may do
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See supra Part I.C.2.
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973).
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so by identifying all grounds on which” that action is unlawful.188 That
language suggests that a plaintiff who is injured by a statutory provision
has Article III standing to challenge that provision on any ground,
including an overbreadth claim. The same conclusion would apply to
inseverability claims in the overbreadth posture. Biker is injured by the
motor vehicle ban, and she would therefore have Article III standing to
challenge it on any ground, including that the protest ban is
unconstitutional and inseverable.
Ultimately, the difference between Speaker and Biker (and the asapplied and overbreadth postures) is this: Speaker is arguing that the
provision that injures him is invalid and the statute is inseverable. Biker is
arguing that the provision that injures her is invalid because the statute is
inseverable. The Court’s claim-specific approach to standing would treat
this difference as dispositive, and would therefore require Speaker, but not
Biker, to establish an injury in fact with respect to both the protest ban and
the motor vehicle ban.
The claim-specific standing approach would therefore create a new
distinction between the as-applied and overbreadth postures. Established
practice is that Article III standing principles always permit severability
rulings in both postures. Under the claim-specific approach to standing,
Article III standing principles would limit severability rulings in the asapplied posture, but not in the overbreadth posture.
2. Severability Is Not a Remedy.—The previous section concluded
that severability is a “claim” for purposes of the claim-specific standing
analysis when it arises in the as-applied posture. But courts and scholars
have often characterized severability as a remedial inquiry in this posture.189
That might suggest a way to reconcile the claim-specific standing theory
with established practice on severability: If severability is remedial, then
perhaps it would not be a claim that requires a showing of standing under
the claim-specific theory after all.
For several reasons, however, the characterization of severability as a
remedial question cannot bear close scrutiny. Rather, severability is best
viewed as a substantive claim that goes to the merits of the plaintiff’s case.
And when the remedial characterization of severability is set aside, it
confirms that the claim-specific approach to standing is inconsistent with
settled practice on severability.
As an initial matter, a severability ruling is not about which type of
remedy to provide to the plaintiff. It is not about whether to provide an
injunction, or a declaratory judgment, or damages. Courts and scholars
188
189

Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 n.5.
See supra notes 101–02.
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have rightly observed that a severability ruling can affect the scope of the
remedy.190 It can determine, for example, whether a declaratory judgment
will cover part of the statute, or all of it. But that is the hallmark of a
substantive, merits question.191 Constitutional rulings regarding different
provisions of a statute determine the scope of the court’s remedy, but that
does not mean that those constitutional rulings should be characterized as
remedial. So, too, for severability.
The test for severability also is not remedial. It turns on substantive
questions of statutory interpretation and legislative intent.192 Remedial
questions, in contrast, consider how to compensate plaintiffs for harm they
have suffered, or how to prevent future harm to plaintiffs.193 In other words,
the law of remedies assumes that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer a
substantive wrong, and asks how to fix it. Severability doctrine, in contrast,
determines whether the plaintiff has suffered a substantive wrong at all, or
the extent of that wrong.194
Moreover, the precedential effect of a severability ruling is not
equivalent to the precedential effect of a remedial ruling. A ruling that a
190

See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) (severability
is about “limit[ing] the solution to the problem”); Gans, supra note 94, at 643 (“[Severability] asks a
remedial question about the scope of the relief a court should order . . . .”).
191
The Article’s argument assumes that justiciability, substantive, and remedial doctrines are
distinct. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 647 (2006) (drawing the same distinction).
Scholars have nevertheless observed that substantive rulings can influence courts’ rulings on standing
or remedies, and vice versa. See id. at 636–37; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). Thus, even when severability is properly viewed as a
substantive question, it may still influence a court’s ruling on standing or remedies. This Article argues,
however, that a problem arises when severability is characterized as remedial because it can create
confusion about how to apply standing doctrine.
192
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010);
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238 (1994)
(“Generally, severability is a question of statutory interpretation, not constitutional law.”); Nagle, supra
note 71, at 226 (“[S]everability is properly considered a question of statutory construction . . . .”).
193
See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 3–5 (4th ed. 2010)
(describing the objectives of the various types of remedies). In fact, commentators who have argued that
severability should be characterized as a remedial inquiry have also recognized that, to fit that
characterization, the test for severability would need to change to turn on remedial considerations,
rather than statutory interpretation and legislative intent. See Gans, supra note 94, at 643–45 (arguing
that “severability should not simply be a matter of divining the intent of the legislature,” and courts
“must play a more active role in answering the remedial question whether or not to sever”); see also
Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers
Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 484–86, 518–21 (2014) (characterizing severability rulings in cases
such as Free Enterprise Fund as remedial rulings, and arguing that the Supreme Court should change its
approach to severability to account for “remedial values”).
194
Cf., e.g., Metzger, supra note 65, at 884–85 (suggesting that severability analysis is substantive
by explaining that severability determines whether applications of the statute are “invalid”); Vermeule,
supra note 65, at 1951 (similar).
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plaintiff is entitled, for example, to an injunction as a remedy against a
particular wrong has precedential effect only for other persons who have
suffered a similar wrong.195 A ruling that a statute is wholly invalid on
inseverability grounds, in contrast, means that the statute cannot be applied
to anyone.196 Thus, the precedential effect of an inseverability ruling is not
limited to persons who have suffered a similar wrong—an injury from the
unconstitutional part of the statute—and instead extends to anyone who is
injured by any part of the statute.
Consideration of both the as-applied and overbreadth postures
confirms that severability should not be understood as “remedial.” When
Speaker argues in the as-applied posture that the protest ban in § 2 of the
Yellowstone Act is unconstitutional and inseverable from the motor vehicle
ban in § 1, he is making the same argument that Biker makes in the
overbreadth posture. But the severability question is not “remedial” for
Biker. It does not determine how to redress a wrong that Biker has suffered.
It instead determines whether Biker has suffered a wrong at all, which
makes it a substantive doctrine. In other words, it determines whether the
motor vehicle ban is unlawful, not how to remedy that problem if it is
unlawful. The same was true, for example, when severability arose in the
overbreadth posture in Alaska Airlines. The severability issue in that case
determined whether the provisions that injured the plaintiffs were lawful,
not how to remedy an injury from the unconstitutional legislative veto
provision.197
3.

Severability Is Still a Claim if It Affects the Scope of
the Remedy.—So there are good reasons not to view severability
as a remedial question, and instead to view it as a substantive claim when it
arises in the as-applied posture. But even if severability could be
understood to be “remedial” in the sense that it affects the scope of the
remedy, that still would not change the application of the claim-specific
approach to standing. In fact, decisions such as Lewis and Moose Lodge
make clear that the claim-specific approach limits the scope of the remedy.
In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that the district court had exceeded
its authority under Article III by issuing an injunction that attempted to
remedy violations of the law that had not injured the plaintiffs.198 The

195

Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting rule that all
plaintiffs who prove patent infringement are entitled to a permanent injunction because the application
of equitable considerations can vary depending on the infringement at issue); id. at 396–97 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (observing that, in deciding whether to grant an injunction based on past practice,
“courts must determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them”).
196
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 32, at 1331–32.
197
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 (1987).
198
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 360 (1996).
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plaintiffs had standing only to challenge the failure to provide special
services to illiterate inmates, the Court held, and the district court therefore
lacked constitutional authority to remedy other types of inadequacies in
prison law libraries.199 In other words, the court could not address
constitutional problems that had not injured the plaintiffs simply by
characterizing its consideration of those problems as determining the scope
of its remedy. Similarly, in Moose Lodge, the Court held that the remedy
entered by the district court was too broad because it was directed to both
the defendant club’s membership policy and its guest-service policy, even
though the plaintiff had standing to challenge only the guest-service
policy.200
This reasoning applies equally to the question of severability in the asapplied posture. If Speaker argues that the protest ban in the Yellowstone
Act is unconstitutional and that the motor vehicle ban is invalid on
inseverability grounds, he is seeking a remedy that covers both the protest
ban and the motor vehicle ban—for example, a declaratory judgment that
both are invalid. To support the full breadth of that remedy, Lewis makes
clear that Speaker would be required to have Article III standing to
challenge the motor vehicle ban under the claim-specific standing theory.201
Lewis and its discussion of the scope of the remedy also confirm that a
plaintiff in the overbreadth posture would not face an Article III standing
problem. If Biker argues that the motor vehicle ban is unlawful because the
protest ban is unconstitutional and inseverable, the remedy need only cover
the motor vehicle ban—for example, a declaratory judgment that the motor
vehicle ban is invalid. Although the court’s ruling would establish that the
protest ban is unconstitutional as a matter of precedent, the remedy need
not say anything about the protest ban in Biker’s case. Thus, Lewis would
not require Biker to have Article III standing with respect to the protest
ban.
In sum, even to the extent that severability can be understood as a
remedial inquiry, the claim-specific approach to standing would still limit
the Article III power of courts to decide severability questions in the asapplied posture. It would not, however, limit their power to decide
severability questions in the overbreadth posture.
4. Application to Cases.—This section applies the preceding analysis
to three paradigmatic Supreme Court decisions that involved questions of
severability—Northern Pipeline, Alaska Airlines, and NFIB. It concludes
that, under the claim-specific approach to standing, the Court could not
199

See id. at 357–58.
See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 168, 170–71 (1972).
201
See 518 U.S. at 357 (“The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced
the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”).
200
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have reached the severability question in Northern Pipeline; that it could
have reached the severability question in Alaska Airlines; and that it could
have reached the severability question in NFIB, albeit for reasons that went
unstated by the Court. This analysis confirms that the claim-specific
approach would change the results of actual cases in which severability is
at issue. And although there are also cases in which the result would not
change, the severability rulings in those cases could no longer be explained
as rulings in the as-applied posture. Instead, they would need to be viewed
as rulings in the overbreadth posture.
In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that § 1471(b) was
unconstitutional as applied to Northern’s contract claims against Marathon,
and that this application was inseverable from the other applications of the
statute.202 Under the claim-specific standing theory, the Court could not
have reached that severability question because Marathon did not have
Article III standing to raise it. The severability question arose in the asapplied posture—Marathon argued that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to it, and that the other applications of the statute were invalid on
inseverability grounds. But Marathon was not injured by the other
applications of the statute, so the Court would have lacked power to rule on
severability.
The claim-specific theory would have required the Court in Northern
Pipeline to defer any ruling on severability until a case arose that presented
the severability issue in the overbreadth posture. For example, a party in a
subsequent case could have been sued on a federal claim that arose under
the bankruptcy code. That party could have argued that the application of
§ 1471(b) to this federal claim was unlawful because the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to state law contract claims, and because the
applications of the statute were inseverable. Until such a case arose,
however, the severability question would have gone unanswered, and it
would have remained unclear whether § 1471(b) was wholly invalid or
only partially invalid.
In Alaska Airlines, in contrast, the outcome would have been the same
under the claim-specific approach to standing. The challenge in that case
arose in the overbreadth posture: The plaintiff airlines argued that the
provisions of the statute that injured them were invalid because the
legislative veto provision was both unconstitutional and inseverable.203 The
claim-specific theory does not limit plaintiffs’ Article III standing to raise
inseverability claims in this posture, so the Court still would have been
correct to rule on severability.
202

See 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982) (plurality opinion); id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment).
203
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 680, 683 (1987).
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In NFIB, the Court also could have ruled on severability under the
claim-specific approach to standing, albeit not for the reasons that it
appears to have assumed. After the Court held that the Medicaid expansion
in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff States, it rejected the States’ argument that the Medicaid expansion
was inseverable without mentioning standing.204 From the States’ vantage
point, this inseverability claim arose in the as-applied posture. The States
therefore could not have raised inseverability under the claim-specific
approach unless they had standing to challenge some other provision of the
statute. Thus, if the States had been the only plaintiffs, the claim-specific
theory might have precluded a severability ruling.205
The States, however, were not the only plaintiffs in NFIB. There were
also private plaintiffs who were injured by the ACA’s individual mandate,
which required them to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.206 Under
the claim-specific approach, these private plaintiffs had Article III standing
to raise the severability question in the overbreadth posture by arguing that,
even if the individual mandate was constitutional, it was still unlawful
because the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional and inseverable from
the remainder of the ACA.207 Because the severability issue determined the
validity of the individual mandate, and because the private plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the individual mandate, the Court had power under
Article III to reach severability.
To be sure, the Court did not frame its analysis in these terms. The
Justices in the majority did not even address standing for the severability
question.208 These Justices likely concluded that a standing analysis was
unnecessary under established practice because the severability question
arose in the as-applied posture with respect to the States. And the Justices
in dissent explicitly argued that a standing analysis was not required in the
as-applied posture.209 Thus, none of the Justices attempted to apply the
204

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 2630, 2642 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
205
In the decision from which NFIB arose, the Eleventh Circuit described the question of whether
the States had standing to challenge the individual mandate as “interesting and difficult,” and declined
to decide that question because it was immaterial to the outcome. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011).
206
See id. at 1244 (concluding that it was “beyond dispute” that the private plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the individual mandate). The Supreme Court did not question this conclusion in NFIB.
207
Cf. Reply Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability at 3–4, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11393 & 11-400), 2012 WL 864595, at *3–4 (arguing that the government’s standing argument was
inapposite because there were multiple plaintiffs with multiple injuries in the case, although not raising
precisely this form of the severability argument).
208
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (plurality opinion); id. at 2630, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
209
See id. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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claim-specific approach to the severability issue. Yet the Court still
happened to reach a result that was consistent with the claim-specific
analysis.
So the claim-specific approach to standing would change the result in
cases like Northern Pipeline, but not in cases like NFIB. To understand the
practical impact of the claim-specific approach, therefore, it would help to
know whether most cases are like Northern Pipeline or like NFIB.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to answer that question with a high degree of
accuracy. In past decisions in which it ruled on severability, the Court did
not consider the claim-specific approach to standing. It simply assumed
that a severability ruling was consistent with Article III, and did not address
whether any of the plaintiffs had standing to raise the severability question.
Any analysis of whether these plaintiffs had standing for severability is
therefore subject to a substantial amount of uncertainty—particularly given
the acknowledged vagaries of standing doctrine.210
Nevertheless, based on my review of the Court’s severability decisions
over the past four decades, and the Court’s description of the parties and
the facts in these decisions, it appears that most decisions in which the
Court has expressly decided severability questions are similar to NFIB.
That is, in most of these cases, at least one plaintiff seemed to have
standing to raise an inseverability argument in the overbreadth posture—
either because the plaintiff raising the constitutional claim was injured by
multiple statutory provisions, or because there were multiple plaintiffs who
were injured by different provisions.211 This analysis suggests that many
results would not change under the claim-specific approach.
Even so, there is an identifiable universe of cases in which the
outcome would change under the claim-specific approach to standing. In
these cases, the Court decided a severability question that arose in the asapplied posture. And although the Court did not address standing, it is
evident from the Court’s description of the facts and the parties that no
210

See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[T]he concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete
consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it . . . .”).
211
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10, 513–
14 (2010) (plaintiffs appeared to be injured by both the provisions protecting Board members from
removal and the provisions authorizing the Board to conduct investigations, and therefore had standing
to argue that the provisions were inseverable); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S.
320, 324–25 (2006) (plaintiffs appeared to be injured by multiple parts of an abortion statute, and
therefore had standing to raise severability); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267–68 (2005)
(there were two defendants challenging the statute, Booker and Fanfan, and the severability question
appeared to make a difference as to how each defendant’s case would proceed on remand, and thus they
had standing to argue that the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act were inseverable); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 18687 (1992) (New York appeared to have standing to challenge separate
provisions of a federal statute governing the disposal of radioactive waste).
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plaintiff would have had Article III standing to raise severability under the
claim-specific approach. Within the past few decades, these decisions
include Northern Pipeline,212 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,213 and Reno
v. ACLU.214 There are undoubtedly more such decisions from prior years
given that the Court has been deciding severability questions since the late
nineteenth century,215 but has not previously applied a claim-specific
standing analysis.216 Lower courts too have often addressed severability
questions in the as-applied posture when it was evident that standing was
lacking.217 The claim-specific approach to standing would therefore disrupt
the status quo on severability by changing the disposition in these types of
cases.
Moreover, even in cases in which the outcome would be the same
under the claim-specific approach, the severability ruling would generally
need to be understood as a ruling in the overbreadth posture, rather than the
as-applied posture. That change in rationale would have real effects. If the
as-applied posture were no longer an outlet for severability rulings, more
severability questions would be channeled into the overbreadth posture.
Rather than being a rarity, claims in this posture would become the norm.
Cases like Alaska Airlines would become more common, and plaintiffs
would increasingly argue that parts of statutes that do not apply to them are

212

458 U.S. 50 (1982).
472 U.S. 491 (1985). In Brockett, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating an
obscenity statute in its entirety on overbreadth grounds. See id. at 507. The Court reasoned that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, who intended to engage only in nonobscene,
protected speech, and it was therefore unnecessary to resort to overbreadth doctrine and facially
invalidate the statute. See id. at 494, 504. The Court nevertheless proceeded to hold that the application
of the statute to the plaintiffs was severable from the remaining applications to obscene speech. See id.
at 506–07. Because those remaining applications did not appear to injure the plaintiffs, see id. at 494,
the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the severability question.
214
521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, the Court addressed, among other things, the constitutionality of
47 U.S.C. § 223(a), which applied to “obscene or indecent” communications, and held that the
application of the statute to “indecent” communications was unconstitutional. See id. at 883. Although
the Court noted that the plaintiffs had not challenged the statute as applied to obscene communications,
the Court held that the term “indecent” was severable from the remainder of the provision. See id. This
severability question did not appear to affect any part of the statute that injured the plaintiffs.
215
See Nagle, supra note 71, at 214.
216
Cf., e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241–45 (1929) (ruling that statute was
inseverable after holding that it was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, without conducting a
separate standing analysis for the severability question); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70–71 (1922)
(ruling that statute was inseverable in part and severable in part without conducting standing analysis).
217
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Tex., Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 211, 215 (5th Cir.
2011) (ruling on severability even though the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the affected
provisions); W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
statute was inseverable without suggesting that the affected provisions injured the plaintiffs); Bd. of
Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (considering severability of statutory
provisions that regulated federal lands and did not appear to affect the state plaintiffs).
213
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unconstitutional and inseverable. It would also be more difficult for courts
to use prudential, third-party standing principles to limit the overbreadth
posture. In light of the constitutional restraints on the as-applied posture,
applying prudential restraints in the overbreadth posture would severely
diminish courts’ ability to make severability rulings at all.
All of this would constitute a significant break from past practice. One
might therefore expect that there should be a good reason for making the
change. As the next section explains, however, no such reason exists.
B. Claim-Specific Standing for Severability Would Undermine the
Purposes of Standing Doctrine
In addition to its purported consistency with existing practice, the
Supreme Court has justified the claim-specific theory on the ground that it
reinforces the central purposes of standing doctrine—protecting the
separation of powers and promoting sound judicial decisions. Although that
justification is plausible in many cases, it fails when the claim-specific
approach is applied to severability questions.
1. Separation of Powers.—Under the claim-specific standing theory,
Article III standing principles would limit rulings on severability in the asapplied posture. That means courts would sometimes lack power to decide
severability questions after ruling that part of a statute is unconstitutional.
But a ruling on severability gives effect to the separation of powers. When
a court finds that part of a statute is unconstitutional, severability doctrine
permits the court to invalidate the statute to the extent that Congress would
have wanted.218 If a court cannot rule on severability, it can be forced to
leave in place a new version of the statute that Congress never would have
enacted. Preventing the court from deciding severability therefore harms
the separation of powers, rather than preserving it
For example, consider Northern Pipeline. In that case, the Court
concluded that granting jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over state law
contract claims was unconstitutional, and that the entire jurisdictional
provision should be invalidated on inseverability grounds.219 That
inseverability ruling was faithful to the separation of powers because it
adhered to Congress’s intent to have the statue stand or fall as a whole.
Under the claim-specific approach to standing, in contrast, the Court could
not have reached the severability issue, and thus could not have invalidated
the entire statute. That disposition would have left the bankruptcy court’s
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See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330–31 (2006).
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982) (plurality
opinion); id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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jurisdiction partially intact—a result that the Court found Congress never
would have wanted.
It is true that the claim-specific approach to standing permits
severability rulings to be made in the overbreadth posture. It thus does not
completely eliminate courts’ power to make severability rulings that are
necessary to protect the separation of powers. In Northern Pipeline, for
example, a severability ruling could have been made in a subsequent case.
But there are some circumstances in which that is not true. Sometimes,
even when the overbreadth posture is taken into account, no party would
ever have Article III standing to challenge a statutory provision. In those
cases, the claim-specific approach would never permit the separation of
powers to be given effect through a severability ruling.
Consider, for example, § 3 of our hypothetical Yellowstone Act,
which appropriates funds to the National Park Service so that it can report
to Congress on the effects of the motor vehicle and protest bans.220 This
spending provision does not injure anyone—at least not in a way that gives
rise to standing under current doctrine.221 That means no plaintiff would
have standing to argue that the appropriation of funds in § 3 is invalid on
inseverability grounds. As a result, if a court struck down both the motor
vehicle ban and the protest ban, it would be required to leave § 3 in place—
even though Congress undoubtedly would not have appropriated funds so
that the National Park Service could report on the effects of statutory
provisions that have been invalidated. In fact, even if Congress included an
inseverability clause in the Yellowstone Act providing that the entire
statute should stand or fall together, a court would still lack constitutional
power under the claim-specific approach to give effect to that clause and
invalidate § 3.
Moreover, even when a severability question could be decided in the
overbreadth posture in a later case, the failure to rule on severability in the
same case as a constitutional ruling would still harm the separation of
powers. It could require the court to leave intact, even if only temporarily, a
new version of the statute that Congress would not have enacted. At
minimum, it would create uncertainty regarding the state of the law, which
would make Congress’s work more difficult. Because it would not know
whether the rest of the statute will be found invalid, Congress would not
know whether a legislative solution is necessary. In contrast, when a court
immediately rules on severability in the as-applied posture, it provides a
definitive decision that Congress can either leave in place or overturn.
220
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Allowing rulings on severability in the overbreadth posture therefore would
not solve the separation of powers problems produced by the claim-specific
approach to standing.
In fact, this reliance on the overbreadth posture for rulings on
severability would ultimately make things worse from the perspective of
standing doctrine. At its core, standing principles are meant to serve the
separation of powers by preventing constitutional rulings regarding
government conduct that does not injure the plaintiff.222 Because it would
channel inseverability claims into the overbreadth posture, however, the
claim-specific approach would fail to advance that purpose. Plaintiffs
injured by one part of a statute would have an increasingly strong incentive
to seek out a constitutional flaw in a different part of the statute that has no
effect on them, and argue that the other part of the statute is
unconstitutional and inseverable.223 Courts would therefore be faced with
far more constitutional questions in the overbreadth posture, which would
produce more conflict between the branches.
A court need not, of course, always reach the merits of a constitutional
claim in the overbreadth posture. In this posture, the court generally should
rule on severability first because, if the statute is severable, the
constitutional question is moot. But that is a prudential exercise of
constitutional avoidance,224 not an Article III limitation. The claim-specific
approach would do nothing to limit the power of a court to decide a
constitutional question in the overbreadth posture.
In the end, therefore, the effect of the claim-specific approach in
statutory cases would be to impose Article III standing limitations on
severability rulings, but not constitutional rulings. That is the opposite of
what one would expect under bedrock principles of standing law. Because
Congress can overturn severability rulings but not constitutional rulings,225
a constitutional ruling is far more disruptive to the separation of powers
than a severability ruling. Indeed, that is why the Court has described its
standing inquiry as “especially rigorous” when a plaintiff challenges the
constitutionality of a federal statute.226 From the perspective of standing,
therefore, it is better to have parties argue about the severability of
provisions that do not apply to them than to argue about the
222

See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
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inseverable); Walsh, supra note 22, at 77 (“If a party affected by any [provision of a statute] could gain
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constitutionality of provisions that do not apply to them. Claim-specific
standing would invert that principle.
Even the current members of the Supreme Court who are most
committed to standing doctrine—i.e., the conservative Justices227—have
recognized that limiting severability rulings in the as-applied posture would
harm the separation of powers. In NFIB, the dissent argued that it would be
“destructive of sound government” to use standing doctrine to prohibit a
severability ruling.228 If a court could not reach severability when it ruled
that a statute was partially unconstitutional, the dissent was concerned that
it would be unclear which parts of the statute remain valid.229 The dissent
also argued that this concern applied with particular force to a
“multifaceted piece of legislation” such as the ACA, because “[i]t would
take years, perhaps decades, for each of its provisions to be adjudicated
separately—and for some of them (those simply expending federal funds)
no one may have separate standing.”230
2. Sound Decisionmaking.—The claim-specific approach to standing
would therefore harm the separation of powers when applied to severability
questions. But that approach might still be thought to support standing
doctrine’s other central purpose—promoting sound judicial decisions. After
all, it would prevent courts from ruling on severability questions that
concern the validity of statutory provisions that do not injure the plaintiff. It
would therefore seem to limit courts to concrete, adverse disputes about
severability. For several reasons, however, applying the claim-specific
theory to severability could easily undermine the interest in sound
decisionmaking. At minimum, the claim-specific approach would not
sufficiently advance the interest in accurate judicial decisions to overcome
the damage that it would do the separation of powers.
As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the injury in fact requirement
would improve the quality of severability arguments and, in turn, the
quality of severability rulings. Scholars have long argued that an injury in
fact does not correlate with good advocacy.231 Even assuming that standing
doctrine nevertheless promotes good advocacy in some contexts, it is
particularly unlikely to do so for severability. The claim-specific approach
would limit severability rulings in the as-applied posture and channel them
into the overbreadth posture. But severability arises in the as-applied
227

See Elliott, supra note 28, at 587.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2671 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
229
Id.
230
Id.; cf. Fallon, supra note 35, at 964 (explaining that the Court’s function is sometimes to
resolve uncertainty); Gans, supra note 94, at 683 (analyzing the practical costs when the effects of
Court’s ruling are not immediately clear).
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posture only if the plaintiff has succeeded on a constitutional claim—which
suggests that the plaintiff is a strong advocate who would make a robust
presentation on severability. In the overbreadth posture, in contrast, the
court can rule on severability before ruling on the plaintiff’s constitutional
claim, so there is no assurance that the plaintiff is a strong advocate.
Moreover, severability is a purely legal question that turns primarily
on Congress’s intent.232 A court’s decision on the issue of severability is
therefore unlikely to be aided by the development of a concrete record in a
case in which the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact. The facts of the
case are unlikely to inform the decision on severability at all. The injury in
fact requirement therefore seems unlikely to enhance the quality of
decisionmaking on severability.
In any event, even if the claim-specific approach could be understood
to promote the interest in sound decisionmaking on severability, it would
undermine that interest for constitutional questions. The claim-specific
approach would allow plaintiffs to raise claims in the overbreadth posture,
and therefore permit highly abstract constitutional challenges to statutory
provisions that do not apply to the plaintiffs. Again, this asymmetry would
turn core principles of standing doctrine on their head. Standing is most
concerned with promoting sound decisions on constitutional questions233—
particularly because Congress can revisit a court’s erroneous severability
(or other statutory) rulings, but not its erroneous constitutional rulings.
*

*

*

In sum, the claim-specific approach to standing is inconsistent with
current practice on severability and would interfere with the purposes of
standing doctrine—particularly in cases in which a severability ruling in
the as-applied posture is necessary to preserve the separation of powers.
The next Part argues that there is a better alternative that both explains
existing practice and advances the aims of standing doctrine in the
severability context—supplemental standing.
IV. SUPPLEMENTAL STANDING
The Supreme Court has justified its adoption of a claim-specific
approach to standing—and its rejection of supplemental standing—on the
ground that claim-specific standing is consistent with existing practice and
serves the purposes of standing doctrine. As shown in the preceding Part,
that justification fails in cases involving severability. In fact, established
232
233

See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–31 (2006).
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practice for severability is best understood as a form of supplemental
standing. This Part explains why a supplemental-standing approach both
conforms to existing severability doctrine and better serves the functions of
standing doctrine.
The problems with the claim-specific theory, however, are not limited
to severability. Existing practice in additional cases already reflects a
supplemental-standing approach. And shifting to a supplemental-standing
approach appears to be warranted in others. This Part therefore concludes
by considering how to develop a more general theory of supplemental
standing.
A. Supplemental Standing for Severability
1. Supplemental Standing Explains Practice on Severability.—As
explained in Part II.A, the concept of supplemental standing does not
require plaintiffs to have standing for every claim that they raise. Rather, a
plaintiff can have standing for some claims and supplemental standing for
related claims. Standing is still required for an Article III “case” to exist,
but it does not define the outer boundaries of such a case. Some other
criterion determines which claims are sufficiently related to fall within the
same Article III case.
Established practice on severability is consistent with a form of
supplemental standing that always grants courts Article III power to rule on
severability in the as-applied posture. In other words, existing practice is
explained by a supplemental-standing approach that treats constitutional
challenges to statutes and severability claims as sufficiently related to fall
within a single Article III case. Thus, when a plaintiff has standing to
challenge a statute on constitutional grounds, the plaintiff has supplemental
standing to raise a severability claim.
To illustrate, suppose again that Speaker challenges the protest ban in
§ 2 of the Yellowstone Act234 as unconstitutional, and argues that the
remainder of the statute is invalid because the protest ban is inseverable.
Under the supplemental-standing approach described here, Speaker still
needs standing for at least one claim to have an Article III case in the first
place—which he does because he is injured by the protest ban. But
standing requirements do not define the limits of that case. Thus, even
though Speaker is not injured by the rest of the statute, his inseverability
argument is not excluded on standing grounds. Rather, Speaker has
supplemental standing for his inseverability claim, and that claim is part of
the same Article III case as his constitutional claim.

234
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This
supplemental-standing
approach
explains
established
understandings of when severability can be decided. Consistent with
existing practice, supplemental standing always grants a court the power to
rule on severability in the as-applied posture after ruling in the plaintiff’s
favor on a constitutional claim.235 For example, the Court’s decision in
Northern Pipeline can be understood as resting on the theory of
supplemental standing. After Marathon succeeded on its argument that
§ 1471(b) was unconstitutional as applied to Northern’s contract claims
against it, Marathon had supplemental standing to argue that the statute’s
applications to other types of claims were invalid on inseverability grounds.
The Court properly accepted that inseverability argument, even though
Marathon lacked standing to challenge the statute’s other applications.
Similarly, in NFIB, the plaintiff States had standing to challenge the
Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) expansion of the Medicaid program, and
supplemental standing to argue that the remainder of the ACA should be
invalidated on inseverability grounds. The Court correctly considered this
inseverability argument under the theory of supplemental standing.
The supplemental-standing approach is also consistent with the
principle that courts are not required to rule on severability arguments in
the as-applied posture. Supplemental standing is about Article III power,
not how it should be exercised. Although it grants courts the constitutional
authority to rule on severability claims, it does not call into question the
types of prudential, third-party standing limitations that courts have used to
avoid immediate rulings on severability.236 For example, in Printz, the
Supreme Court had constitutional authority under a supplemental-standing
theory to decide the question of severability in the as-applied posture, but
was free to limit the exercise of that authority based on prudential
considerations.237
In addition, supplemental standing is consistent with practice in the
overbreadth posture. The prevailing view among courts and scholars is that
a plaintiff has Article III standing for a claim in the overbreadth posture.238
For example, in Alaska Airlines, the plaintiffs had standing to argue that the
legislative veto was unconstitutional and inseverable from the provisions
that injured them. That view is consistent even with claim-specific
standing,239 and is therefore consistent with the more permissive
supplemental-standing approach as well. In other words, while
supplemental standing supports the power to rule on severability in the as235
236
237
238
239

See supra Part I.C.1.
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applied posture, it does not limit the power to rule on severability in the
overbreadth posture. Supplemental standing would not, however, require
severability rulings in decisions such as NFIB to be reformulated as rulings
in the overbreadth posture, as the claim-specific approach would.240
2.

Supplemental Standing for Severability Advances the Purposes of
Standing Doctrine.—The supplemental-standing approach to
severability also better serves the functions of standing doctrine—
protecting the separation of powers and promoting sound decisions—than
the claim-specific approach. This conclusion follows from the analysis in
Part III.B, which showed that the claim-specific approach would undermine
the aims of standing law in the severability context by preventing
severability rulings in the as-applied posture. Supplemental standing for
severability permits those rulings, and therefore advances the purposes of
standing doctrine for all of the same reasons that the claim-specific
approach for severability would not.
In particular, unlike claim-specific standing, the supplementalstanding approach always authorizes courts to make severability rulings
that are necessary to preserve the separation of powers. That eliminates the
problems that would arise if, after ruling in the plaintiff’s favor on a
constitutional challenge to a statute, the court were required to leave in
place a revised statute that Congress never would have enacted. It also
means that a court would not be required to leave the state of the law
uncertain by deferring a ruling on severability to a later case. Congress
would know immediately whether a legislative fix is required.
That said, the supplemental-standing theory would still allow courts to
refrain from deciding severability questions if there were good prudential
reasons to do so.241 For example, the parties may fail to raise a severability
dispute, or they may poorly frame the issue and thus fail to help the court
reach a sound decision. Supplemental standing would allow courts to
balance the harms and benefits of deferring a ruling on severability. And
because the reasons for addressing or declining to address severability in
particular cases would be prudential, rather than constitutional, they would
be subject to democratic controls by Congress.242
The supplemental-standing approach to severability also avoids the
counterintuitive asymmetry created by the claim-specific approach between
the as-applied posture and the overbreadth posture. Under supplemental
standing, Article III permits severability rulings in both postures, and both
postures are subject to prudential standing limitations. Thus, the

240
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supplemental-standing approach does not invert principles of separation of
powers by making it easier to decide a constitutional question in the
overbreadth posture than to decide a severability question in the as-applied
posture.
In theory, another alternative for eliminating this asymmetry would be
to double down on claim-specific standing and limit Article III standing in
the overbreadth posture as well. One way to achieve that result would be to
permit a severability ruling only when a single plaintiff is injured by
multiple parts of a statute, and that plaintiff therefore has standing for both
the constitutional claim and the inseverability claim. But this approach
would, like the existing claim-specific approach, interfere with the
separation of powers by preventing numerous severability rulings in the asapplied posture that are necessary to give effect to Congress’s intent. For
example, a court might never be able to rule on the validity of provisions of
a complex statute like the ACA that do not directly injure anyone, even if it
were clear that Congress would not have enacted those provisions on their
own.243 It would also be difficult to apply Article III standing limitations to
severability questions in the overbreadth posture without casting doubt on
well-established decisions and scholarship on First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine.244
Ultimately, therefore, the concept of supplemental standing is
preferable to the claim-specific approach in the severability context.
Supplemental standing explains established practice on severability and is
more faithful to the purposes of standing doctrine. The Court was therefore
incorrect in Cuno to assert that the claim-specific approach is always
consistent with existing practice and always furthers the aims of standing
law. And the Court erred, at least as a matter of principle, in dismissing
supplemental standing as a categorical matter.
B. Toward a General Theory of Supplemental Standing
The preceding discussion has focused on the problems that arise when
the claim-specific approach to standing is applied to severability, and the
benefits of a theory that grants supplemental standing for severability
claims. But does supplemental standing fit into the law more generally, or
is severability merely an isolated case in which the claim-specific theory of
standing breaks down? If the problems in the severability context were sui
generis, it might make sense for purposes of uniformity and simplicity to
accept those problems and apply the claim-specific theory across the board,
rather than developing a new theory of supplemental standing. As this
section explains, however, severability is not the only context in which
243
244
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established practice is inconsistent with the claim-specific approach to
standing. In at least two other contexts, existing practice already appears to
reflect a supplemental-standing approach. That means there is a broader
problem with claim-specific standing, and suggests that there are additional
contexts in which supplemental standing is warranted.
1. Supplemental Standing Explains Practice in Other Contexts.—In
addition to cases involving severability, the Supreme Court has effectively
adopted a supplemental-standing approach in cases involving facial
challenges to statutes and cases involving multiple plaintiffs raising the
same claim. And it has done so with good reason.
a. Facial challenges.—Existing practice for facial challenges
can be explained by supplemental standing, but not the claim-specific
approach to standing. When a court invalidates a statute pursuant to a facial
challenge, it rules that the statute cannot be applied to anyone.245 Courts
therefore effectively grant plaintiffs raising facial challenges supplemental
standing to assert the claims of other potential plaintiffs.
Take, for example, the Court’s recent decision in United States v.
Windsor.246 The plaintiff in that case argued that § 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act, which defined “marriage” for purposes of federal law, was
unconstitutional as applied to same-sex marriages.247 Under the claimspecific approach, the Court could have ruled only on the application of the
statute that the plaintiff had standing to challenge—its application to samesex marriages. Yet under current practice, the effect of the Court’s ruling
was to strike down § 3 on its face because the Court held it was enacted
pursuant to an improper legislative purpose.248 The Court thus effectively
granted the plaintiff supplemental standing to challenge the statute’s
application to other marriages.
Similarly, in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that a
federal statute that regulated election-related expenditures by corporations

245

See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 32, at 1326. Professor Fallon has explained that, some doctrinal
tests, such as “suspect-content” tests, result in facial invalidation because they preclude any subsequent
severance of statutory applications. Id. at 1346. But other doctrinal tests, such as tests that turn on
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violated the First Amendment.249 The plaintiff in Citizens United was
engaging in—or at least was assumed to be engaging in—protected speech,
and therefore would have had standing under the claim-specific approach
to challenge only the application of the statute to protected speech.250 But
the Court made clear that it was invalidating the statute as a facial matter.251
It therefore implicitly granted the plaintiff supplemental standing to
challenge the statute’s application to all speech, including unprotected
speech.
Furthermore, as in the severability context, established practice for
facial challenges is faithful to the purposes of standing doctrine, whereas
the claim-specific approach would undermine those purposes. Limiting a
court’s power to decide a facial challenge on standing grounds could overly
burden the court’s exercise of judicial review and its ability to make clear
what the law is.252 It could also lead to excessive interbranch conflict by
requiring courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statute repeatedly on
an application-by-application basis over time.253 The existing supplementalstanding approach, in contrast, authorizes a court to decide a facial
challenge in a manner that accounts for separation of powers concerns. As
in the severability context, however, the courts and Congress can still
impose prudential restraints on the exercise of this authority to decide facial
challenges.
b. Multiple plaintiffs.—The claim-specific approach to standing
is also in serious tension with the oft-invoked rule that, if one plaintiff has
standing for a claim, a court need not decide whether other plaintiffs in the
case have standing for that claim.254 Contrary to the claim-specific
approach, this practice does not require plaintiffs to have standing for every
claim that they raise. It is therefore better understood as a form of
supplemental standing. It interprets Article III broadly, to allow a case to
include claims that some of the plaintiffs lack standing to assert, so long as
another plaintiff has standing for those claims.255
249
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This practice is also faithful to the underlying purposes of standing
doctrine. If one plaintiff has standing to raise a claim, a ruling on the merits
of that claim is, by definition, consistent with the separation of powers and
sound decisionmaking interests of standing doctrine.256 To be sure, giving
that ruling effect for other plaintiffs who have not been injured raises
potential concerns.257 But those concerns can be addressed through
prudential rules on joinder, class actions, and preclusion, rather than with
an inflexible constitutional requirement.
2.

Supplemental Standing Appears to Be Justified in Additional
Circumstances.—Current practice thus effectively adopts the
concept of supplemental standing in at least three circumstances—
severability, facial challenges, and cases with multiple plaintiffs. These
examples establish that the Supreme Court was incorrect in Cuno when it
purported to reject supplemental standing on a categorical basis. They also
suggest that there may be other contexts in which the law should recognize
supplemental standing. And they ultimately suggest that we need a general
theory of supplemental standing that can both explain current practice and
identify other cases in which courts should grant supplemental standing.
This Article does not attempt to develop a full-blown theory of when
supplemental standing is warranted—a question that I intend to address in
future work. But it is possible to sketch two ways to approach the subject.
One potential approach would be category-based. This approach
would treat the claim-specific standing requirement as a default rule, but
recognize that there are exceptions for particular categories of cases and
questions, such as severability. And it would identify those exceptions by
looking for categories of cases or questions in which supplemental standing
would be more faithful to the aims of standing doctrine, including the
preservation of the separation of powers.
Another potential approach would be standard-based. This approach
would be similar to the Court’s approach to supplemental jurisdiction under
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, which defines a constitutional
case for jurisdictional purposes to include all claims that arise from a
“common nucleus of operative fact.”258 A standard-based approach for
supplemental standing could likewise rely on a generally applicable
definition of a constitutional case for standing purposes. Courts could then
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apply that definition and grant supplemental standing on a case-by-case and
claim-by-claim basis.
My tentative view is that, in the standing context, a category-based
approach is preferable. Experience has shown that the case-by-case
application of a standard like the one from Gibbs can easily give rise to
uncertainty and conflicting results.259 A category-based approach, in
contrast, would be conducive to greater certainty and ease of application.
The goal would be to identify discrete exceptions to the claim-specific
standing requirement, so that courts could easily determine whether a given
claim falls within one of the exceptions.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether a single standard could both explain
the current exceptions to the claim-specific standing approach and still
preserve the aims of standing doctrine. For example, the Gibbs standard of
a “common nucleus of operative fact” might not even solve the primary
problem to which this Article is directed, which is to permit supplemental
standing for severability claims. That standard looks to whether claims are
factually related, but it is not clear that a constitutional claim and a
severability claim are factually related in the sense of Gibbs. Scholars have
proposed broader definitions of an Article III case for purposes of
supplemental jurisdiction that might sweep in severability arguments—for
example, a test that looks to whether claims are logically or legally
related.260 But those tests could easily go too far if adopted for purposes of
standing doctrine. They would grant courts extensive authority to decide
claims that plaintiffs lack standing to raise, which would threaten the
separation of powers for the reasons that the Court expressed in Cuno.261
The category-based approach, in contrast, would permit supplemental
standing only when it is consonant with the purposes of standing doctrine,
and would still maintain general limitations on the power of the federal
courts.
All of this is not to say, however, that a category-based approach
should be applied as a constitutional matter. Rather, such an approach
could be applied as a statutory matter rather than as a matter of
259
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constitutional law. In other words, Article III could be interpreted to permit
supplemental standing for a broad range of claims—perhaps based on a
logical-relationship or legal-relationship standard. And category-based
limitations on supplemental standing could then be imposed by statute.
This approach would have the virtue of making standing doctrine more
democratic by shifting control to Congress and away from the courts.
Congress could then make the same sort of choice for supplemental
standing that it has made for supplemental jurisdiction262—whether to
implement supplemental standing to the full extent allowed by the
Constitution, or whether to impose additional limitations on the exercise of
supplemental standing.
So which additional categories of cases or questions might properly
fall within a category-based approach to supplemental standing, either as a
statutory or constitutional matter? I conclude by offering two potential
examples. First, shifting to a supplemental-standing approach appears to be
justified when a plaintiff seeks multiple remedies for the same
constitutional violation, but does not have standing for all of those
remedies. In other words, the Court erred in Lyons when it held that
plaintiffs must have standing for every remedy they seek.263 That
requirement is counterproductive from a separation of powers perspective
because courts can often protect the separation of powers more effectively
through flexible remedial doctrines, rather than blunt jurisdictional
doctrines.264 Using standing requirements to limit the availability of
particular remedies can also harm the separation of powers by narrowing
Congress’s authority to decide whether to provide particular remedies for
particular wrongs.265 A supplemental-standing approach for remedies could
address these concerns and better preserve the separation of powers.266
Second, and more tentatively, supplemental standing might be justified
for constitutional claims that have important separation of powers
implications, and that no plaintiff would ever have standing to raise. The
Supreme Court has often held that standing doctrine requires dismissal of a
claim even if no plaintiff would conceivably have standing to raise it.267 But
scholars have recognized that the separation of powers and the lawdeclaring function of the federal courts are diminished when an important
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constitutional question can never be decided.268 Supplemental standing
could help to address this problem by providing a basis for ruling on these
types of claims without doing away with standing doctrine altogether.
For example, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,
the Court confronted a question laden with separation of powers
consequences: whether members of Congress could constitutionally hold
memberships in the Armed Forces Reserves.269 The Court dismissed the
case for lack of standing, even though it acknowledged that no plaintiff was
likely to have standing to raise this question.270 A supplemental-standing
approach could provide an avenue for a ruling on the merits of such a
claim. Under this approach, if a plaintiff had standing for some other claim,
and if the claims were sufficiently related to be joined in a single case
under the rules of procedure, there would be no Article III impediment to a
ruling on the constitutional claim. The basis for this approach would be that
a ruling on the merits would ultimately be more faithful to the separation of
powers than rejecting the claim as a threshold matter. But this approach
would still impose principled limitations on the power of the federal courts
to decide constitutional questions in the absence of standing.
In any event, the aim of this Article is not to identify all of the
problems with the claim-specific approach to standing, or to develop a
complete theory of supplemental standing. Rather, it is to explain that the
Court was wrong to adopt claim-specific standing as a categorical matter,
and that the concept of supplemental standing should be adopted in at least
some cases, including cases presenting severability questions.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the Supreme Court’s rationales for a
claim-specific approach to standing cannot withstand scrutiny in the
context of severability doctrine. Well-established practice for severability
already reflects the concept of supplemental standing, and is justified in
doing so. In fact, for these reasons, it is unclear whether any current
members of the Court would dispute that some form of supplemental
standing is necessary in severability cases. The Court did purport to rule
out supplemental standing in Cuno. But all nine Justices appear to have
embraced supplemental standing for severability, at least implicitly, in
NFIB. The five Justices who held that the ACA was severable did not even
mention the possibility that standing principles might limit their
consideration of severability. Absent a supplemental-standing approach,
however, at least some deliberation on standing would have been
268
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necessary. And the dissent flatly rejected the limitations that the claimspecific approach to standing would impose on severability rulings. It
relied on arguments that were, at bottom, arguments for a theory of
supplemental standing that would always allow a severability ruling in the
same case as a constitutional ruling.
Thus, the entire Court has effectively invited the adoption of
supplemental standing for severability. This Article suggests that the Court
should be taken up on that invitation. But it also suggests that severability
is not merely a special case, and that supplemental standing should apply in
other contexts as well. Indeed, as NFIB reflects, the concept of
supplemental standing should ultimately have appeal for both proponents
and skeptics of current standing doctrine. That is because supplemental
standing would draw on the bedrock principles that motivate standing
doctrine in the first place. Yet it would also have the virtues of making the
doctrine more flexible, enabling courts to decide important questions that
they could not otherwise reach, and advancing democratic principles by
placing more responsibility with Congress to decide which claims belong
in federal court.
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